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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AS A FEDERAL COURT
PAUL R. GUGLIUZZA*
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals and, as a consequence, the last word
on many legal issues important to innovation policy. This Article
shows how the Federal Circuit augments its already significant
power by impeding other government institutions from influencing
the patent system. Specifically, the Federal Circuit has shaped
patent-law doctrine, along with rules of jurisdiction, procedure, and
administrative law, to preserve and expand the court’s power in four
interinstitutional relationships: the court’s federalism relationship
with state courts, its separation of powers relationship with the
executive and legislative branches, its vertical relationship with trial
courts, and its horizontal relationship with the regional circuits. The
Article leverages this descriptive contribution to consider whether
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specialized or semispecialized courts will inevitably exclude other
institutions from shaping the law within their domain. Although
judicial behavior will likely vary depending on the court’s jurisdic-
tional model, the Federal Circuit’s power enhancement arguably
relates to the court’s dual missions to construct a uniform patent law
and to provide expert adjudication in patent cases. 
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INTRODUCTION
One court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has
an enormous influence on patent law and innovation policy. Some
of this influence is by design, as the Federal Circuit has near-
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.  This Article shows how1
the Federal Circuit has supplemented this already significant
authority by impeding other government institutions from shaping
patent law. The Federal Circuit’s consolidation of power raises ques-
tions about whether this semispecialized court will embrace legal
reforms that may be needed to ensure the patent system promotes,
rather than thwarts, innovation.2
The existing scholarship on the power dynamics of the patent
system is rich and important  but has examined institutional rela-3
tionships mostly in isolation, independently documenting power
struggles between the Federal Circuit and institutions such as the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),  the U.S. district courts,  and4 5
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
2. Cf. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 5 (2009) (suggesting that courts, not Congress, are best positioned to reform patent
law).
3. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747 (2011);
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010); John M. Golden, The
Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657 (2009); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1547 (2011); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965 (2009); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011);
Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
31 (2011); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); Sarah Tran,
Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831 (2012); Liza
Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV. 501
(2010); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011).
4. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1415 (1995); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595 (2012); Melissa F.
Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013).
5. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008).
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the International Trade Commission (ITC).  This Article, by con-6
trast, comprehensively examines the Federal Circuit’s interactions
with all other government bodies that encounter patent law. This
multidimensional analysis supports what scholars of judicial behav-
ior have previously theorized: that specialized or semispecialized
courts might naturally tend to expand their power.  Yet the analysis7
also generates deeper questions about why this power expansion
occurs. 
This Article begins with a descriptive task, using federal courts
theory to map the Federal Circuit’s four key relationships, namely,
its relationships with state courts (the federalism relationship),
other branches of the federal government (the separation of powers
relationship), the district courts and the ITC (the vertical relation-
ship), and the regional circuits (the horizontal relationship). In all
four relationships, the Federal Circuit has obstructed other insti-
tutions from shaping patent law. 
One additional important relationship, that of the Federal Circuit
with the U.S. Supreme Court, is too complex to examine fully in this
space. The Article, however, provides numerous examples of Federal
Circuit rules of jurisdiction and procedure that are inconsistent
with general legal principles established by the Supreme Court.8
These examples of Federal Circuit exceptionalism support a theory
that the Federal Circuit has also attempted to enhance its power
vis-à-vis the Supreme Court and are consistent with scholarship
6. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 3. For an exception to the typical one-dimensional
approach, see Rai, supra note 3, which studies the fact-finding and policy-making capabilities
of the Federal Circuit, PTO, and district courts. 
7. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 54 (2011) (“[S]pecialist judges
may favor expansion of their jurisdiction when such an expansion strengthens the rationale
for maintaining their court.”); Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, Religious
Tribunals, and the Democratic Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 231, 259
(2011) (“[C]ourts of limited jurisdiction may be inclined to broadly interpret their
jurisdictional empowerments in order to maintain a continuing flow of cases and thereby to
justify their existence and perhaps garner more attention, respect, funds, and judgeships.”);
Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 877
(2012) (suggesting that “a specialized court seems more likely to allocate the power to decide
certain issues to itself rather than to juries”).
8. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
exceptionalistic approach to federal jurisdiction, judicial review of agency action, remedies for
patent infringement, and declaratory judgment standing). 
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suggesting that specialized courts are peculiarly resistant to
Supreme Court supervision.9
From a normative perspective, the mere fact of institutional
power enhancement is not necessarily condemnable. In expanding
its power, however, the Federal Circuit has sometimes abandoned
its ostensible role of patent appellate court to play roles better
suited to other institutions. For example, the Federal Circuit has
acted as a state court in extending its jurisdiction to include many
claims created by state law, has acted as a fact-finder by refusing
deference to district court interpretations of patent claims,  and has10
acted as an agency administrator by dictating the process of patent
examination at the PTO.  This shape shifting relates to important11
problems in the patent system, such as the unpredictability of claim
construction.  Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s consistent power ex-12
pansion finds few analogues in the regional circuits, which regularly
cede power over federal law to state courts  and appear to be less13
searching in their appellate review of district court decisions.  14
Why then, at least in cases in which existing doctrine mandates
no clear outcome, does the Federal Circuit seem to favor the power-
enhancing result? This expansionary drift could be analogized to the
9. See Lawrence Baum, Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and
Lower Federal Courts, 47 POL. RES. Q. 693, 701 (1994); see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal
(Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1133-34 (2010)
(arguing that the Federal Circuit is pressured by the PTO and district courts to turn the
Supreme Court’s flexible patent-law standards into bright-line rules). 
10. See infra notes 200-22 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
12. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009) (“Claim construction is sufficiently
uncertain that many parties don’t settle a case until after the court has construed the claims,
because there is no baseline for agreement on what the patent might possibly cover. Even
after claim construction, the meaning of the claims remains uncertain, not only because of the
very real prospect of reversal on appeal but also because lawyers immediately begin fighting
about the meaning of the words used to construe the words of the claims.”).
13. See, e.g., Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to
follow Federal Circuit jurisdictional law in a legal malpractice case).
14. See Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study,
46 U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 723 (2012) (showing that reversal rates in Federal Circuit patent cases
are significantly higher than in regional circuit cases). As discussed in more detail below, not
all scholars agree that reversal rates are significantly higher in Federal Circuit patent cases
than in similarly complex cases in the regional circuits. See infra note 231 and accompanying
text.
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behavior of a specialized government agency.  Yet other complex15
influences may lead the court to incrementally expand its authority.
For example, existing literature suggests that specialized courts
might develop a “mission” to serve the policy that justified their
creation.  Congress gave the Federal Circuit a clear mandate to16
bring uniformity to patent law,  and the court frequently cites legal17
uniformity as a reason to limit the power of other government
bodies.  Also, the Federal Circuit is a singular institution and an18
experiment in institutional design; it is the only Article III court of
appeals with jurisdiction defined by case subject matter, not geog-
raphy.  The court has arguably helped ensure its continued exist-19
ence by affirming the legal, social, and political importance of patent
law and by enhancing the importance of the court to the patent
system.  20
But the Federal Circuit is not just a patent court. It also has juris-
diction over appeals involving international trade, veterans benefits,
government contracts, and other matters.  The court’s power21
enhancement in patent law contrasts with the court’s nonpatent
decisions, which often grant deference to inferior tribunals and are
characterized by relatively high affirmance rates.  A complete in-22
quiry into power dynamics in nonpatent cases is difficult, however,
15. See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 16-18 (1967) (discussing the “widely
prevalent notion that bureaus have an inherent tendency to expand”).
16. BAUM, supra note 7, at 39-40.
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5-6 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285-86
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Federal Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction over a state-law
malpractice claim against patent attorneys, emphasizing “Congress’ intent to remove non-
uniformity in the patent law”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc) (“[T]his court’s role in providing national uniformity ... would be impeded if
we were bound to give deference to a trial judge’s asserted factual determinations incident to
claim construction.”); see also infra notes 336-40 and accompanying text. These frequent
appeals to the value of uniformity also give lie to the court’s oft-discussed insistence that
policy concerns are irrelevant to adjudication of patent disputes. See Paul R. Gugliuzza,
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1440 n.7 (2012) (collecting
statements by the court’s judges expressing disinterest in policy concerns).
19. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT
72 (1998) (commission chaired by Supreme Court Justice Byron White noting that the Federal
Circuit is “the most significant and innovative structural alteration in the federal
intermediate appellate tier since its establishment”).
20. See infra notes 350-55 and accompanying text.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
22. See infra Part VI.B.
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for many of those cases are governed by statutes that limit the scope
or rigor of appellate review.  Still, scholars of institutional design23
have suggested that administrative agencies charged with multi-
ple objectives tend to give prominence to one of those goals due to
agency culture, history, monitoring difficulties, and political con-
cerns.  A similar dynamic could manifest in a semispecialized court,24
with the court enhancing its power in cases that are central to its
mission, such as patent cases in the example of the Federal Circuit,
and surrendering power in fields that the bar, the academy, and the
public often ignore. 
It is therefore worthwhile to consider prophylactic measures to
ensure against marginalization of a semispecialized court’s less
visible matters. One alternative, which I have introduced in pre-
vious work, is a model of limited specialization.  As applied to the25
Federal Circuit, a model of limited specialization would maintain
the court’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent law, remove its exclu-
sive jurisdiction in most other areas, and instead grant the court
nonexclusive jurisdiction over a wide variety of nonpatent cases.26
This reimagined court would more closely resemble a regional
circuit, which might make it identify less closely with a mission to
unify patent law and less likely to expand its power in ways that
harm the patent system.27
This Article proceeds as follows. The first Part provides back-
ground on the Federal Circuit and the patent system. The next four
Parts identify and deconstruct the Federal Circuit’s interinstitu-
tional relationships, showing how the court has generally protected
and expanded its power relative to other government institutions.
The final Part uses this institutional analysis to assess the potential
effects of specialization on judicial decision making. It concludes
that specialized courts might naturally expand their power to carry
23. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (2006) (providing that the Federal Circuit may review
only pure questions of law in veterans cases).
24. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-
Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61 (2009); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial
Administration 34-37 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 12-41, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133658. 
25. Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1494-1505.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 1498-99.
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out the purposes for which they were created, to increase the
prestige of the institution and its popularity with the bar, and to
protect the court from abolition or jurisdictional change. The dy-
namics at play are highly nuanced, however, as shown by the differ-
ent degrees of Federal Circuit power enhancement in the different
relationships studied. The Article thus concludes by outlining future
research that could elaborate on and test the theoretical contribu-
tion of this project. 
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE PATENT SYSTEM
Despite its relatively narrow jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit is
one of the most powerful courts in the federal judiciary. Patent law
is increasingly important to the American and global economies,28
and, although the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law is grow-
ing,  the Federal Circuit still has the last word on many important29
issues. As an introduction to the Federal Circuit’s interinstitutional
relationships, this Part describes the court’s jurisdiction and dis-
cusses how problems in patent law could be linked to the patent
system’s institutional structure.
A. Federal Circuit Patent Jurisdiction
Congress created the modern three-tier system of federal courts
in 1891.  For nearly one hundred years, appeals in patent litigation30
were heard by the court of appeals for the regional circuit encom-
passing the district court.  But appellate specialization was not31
foreign to patent law. From 1929 until 1982, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) heard appeals from proceedings at the
28. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 9-18 (2004); Charles Duhigg & Steven Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-
giants-can-stifle-competition.html.
29. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme
Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792-93 (2010); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2202327.
30. See Judiciary (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1976) (repealed 1982).
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PTO.  The CCPA also heard appeals from the International Trade32
Commission (ITC),  which has jurisdiction to prohibit importation33
of products that infringe U.S. patents.  34
In 1982, Congress effectively ended this multiforum system for
patent appeals by merging the CCPA with the appellate division of
the Court of Claims to create the Federal Circuit.  The Federal35
Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) granted the Federal Circuit ex-
clusive jurisdiction over three types of patent cases: (1) federal
district court cases “arising under” the patent laws—typically,
claims of patent infringement or claims seeking a declaratory judg-
ment of patent invalidity; (2) appeals from proceedings within the
PTO—typically, rejections of patent applications or disputes about
which party is entitled to patent a particular invention; and
(3) appeals from ITC investigations into whether imported products
infringe U.S. patents.  36
Proponents of centralizing patent appeals in the Federal Circuit
relied upon what Lawrence Baum has called the three “neutral
virtues” of specialization: promoting uniformity of the law, increas-
ing the quality of decision making, and enhancing the efficiency of
case disposition.  For example, the legislative history of the FCIA37
notes that disuniformity in patent law was encouraging “unseemly
forum-shopping,”  that the Federal Circuit would provide “expertise38
32. Id. § 1542 (repealed 1982); see GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS 1 (1980).
33. See RICH, supra note 32, at 2.
34. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). 
35. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Congress created the Court of Claims in 1855. The court
primarily heard nontort claims, including patent infringement claims, against the federal
government. Congress later split the court into a trial division staffed by Article I
“commissioners” and an appellate division with Article III judges. Upon the Federal Circuit’s
creation, the trial division became what is now the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. See U.S.
COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, THE PEOPLE’S COURT 4, 9-10, available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/court_info/Court_History _Brochure.pdf. 
36. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 § 127 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)
(2006)). Congress recently expanded the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to include district court
cases containing compulsory counterclaims arising under patent laws. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331-32 (2011) (to be codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)); see also infra note 87 (discussing recent jurisdictional changes).
37. BAUM, supra note 7, at 32-33.
38. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981).
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in highly specialized and technical areas,”  and that the Act would39
remove “time-consuming [patent] cases from the dockets of the
regional court[s] of appeals.”  40
B. A Patent Crisis?
It is not clear whether the Federal Circuit has brought unifor-
mity, quality, or efficiency to patent law. Some have praised the
court for making patent law more uniform,  but the acclaim is not41
unanimous.  Whether appellate patent law is uniform or not, forum42
shopping remains widespread in patent litigation because of drastic
differences in district court practices and outcomes.  As for the43
substance of patent law, Federal Circuit case law has been criticized
as too rule oriented,  sometimes precluding lower courts from44
adjusting patent law to account for differences among innovating
industries.  But not all scholars view the Federal Circuit as overly45
formalistic.  46
39. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22-23.
41. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (1989).
42. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit
by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 818 (2010) (noting a “fair
share of discord” within the Federal Circuit); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105, 1111-12 (2004) (documenting divergent claim-construction methodologies within
the Federal Circuit).
43. See Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment
to Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1072-79 (2012); Mark A.
Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 403-04 (2010); Kimberly A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 889, 907-23 (2001).
44. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 27 (2010); John
R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (2003); see also
Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elecs., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Mass. 2001) (Young, C.J.)
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s “emphasis ... on the careful delineation of ever more explicit
and detailed rules, a ‘patent code,’ if you will”). 
45. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1674 (2003).
46. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope, 1 IP THEORY 88, 89
(2010); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 427-28 (2009).
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Despite these debates, many commentators believe that the pat-
ent system needs improvement.  Critiques commonly focus on the47
increasing number of patents,  the unclear scope of many patents,48 49
the growing amount and cost of patent litigation,  and the unpre-50
dictability of patent cases.  Some scholars have attributed these51
problems to the Federal Circuit’s monopoly on patent appeals,
arguing that the system needs more input from the executive
branch  or from peer-level or superior appellate court decisions.52 53
Building on that literature, this Article shows how the Federal
Circuit has inhibited other institutions from developing substantive
patent law and considers how this exclusion affects the patent
system. 
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT FEDERALISM
Two of the Federal Circuit’s four key relationships trace the
central themes of the field of federal courts: judicial federalism and
separation of powers.  Judicial federalism considers “the respective54
47. See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, at xiii-xiv (2012); Richard A.
Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012, 10:20 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-
america/259725.
48. Over the past thirty years, the number of patents issued annually has increased
nearly fourfold, from about 58,000 in 1982 to about 225,000 in 2011. See U.S. Patent Activity
Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
49. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 25, 56-58 (2008).
50. See MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWER
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 210 (2009); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 348 (2003).
51. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2001) (noting that de novo review of important issues by the
Federal Circuit “increases uncertainty and prolongs litigation because parties hold out for
Federal Circuit review”).
52. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270-73 (2007); see also
John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 518, 543-44 (2010) (discussing the Solicitor General’s success in obtaining certiorari and
reversals of the Federal Circuit, and arguing that this dynamic has shifted power over patent
law to the executive branch). 
53. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 3, at 1622; Rai, supra note 3, at 1124-25.
54. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 33 (4th ed. 2003). 
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competences of state and federal courts to adjudicate issues and
award remedies in cases of joint state and federal interest.”  In the55
federalism relationship, the Federal Circuit has enhanced its power
by broadly interpreting the scope of exclusive federal district court
and Federal Circuit jurisdiction over legal claims created by state
law. 
Shortly before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court in
Gunn v. Minton rejected the Federal Circuit’s approach to jurisdic-
tion, returning authority over many patent-related state-law claims
to state courts.  Yet the story of how the Federal Circuit developed56
its unusually expansive view of federal authority remains highly
salient, for it introduces several institutional themes critical to
understanding power dynamics in patent law, such as the Supreme
Court’s consistent rejection of the Federal Circuit’s exceptionalist
rules of jurisdiction and procedure. In addition, the history of the
federalism relationship illustrates how the Federal Circuit has
restricted the power of other government institutions by invoking
the court’s mission to unify patent law. 
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
To understand a federalism analysis of the Federal Circuit, it is
helpful to first summarize governing principles of federal subject
matter jurisdiction. The general federal question statute provides
the district courts with original jurisdiction over civil actions
“arising under” federal law.  Separate provisions grant the district57
courts exclusive original jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit exclu-
sive appellate jurisdiction, over cases arising under federal patent
law.  In its well-pleaded complaint rule, the Supreme Court has58
required that the jurisdictional analysis focus on the plaintiff’s
complaint, not on any defenses or counterclaims.  Cases in which59
55. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1142
n.1 (1988).
56. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
58. Id. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 19(a)-(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331-32 (2011).
59. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). As discussed
below, recent legislation has made this rule partially inapplicable to patent cases. See infra
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the complaint includes a legal claim created by federal law almost
always arise under federal law.  However, cases presenting only60
claims created by state law can still arise under federal law if the
complaint raises “a significant federal issue.”  61
Only a handful of Supreme Court cases explore the jurisdictional
rules governing these state-law claims raising embedded federal
questions.  As discussed below, before the Supreme Court decided62
Gunn, the Federal Circuit had essentially held that any state-law
claim that required application of patent law was subject to federal
arising under jurisdiction.  The Federal Circuit had adopted this63
expansive view despite two prominent Supreme Court cases
strongly suggesting that federal jurisdiction over a state-law claim
requires a disputed question of federal law. 
In 2005, the Court decided Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v.
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,  which has been hailed as the64
Court’s “finest effort” in addressing embedded federal questions.65
In that case, the IRS had seized land owned by Grable to satisfy a
federal tax delinquency.  The IRS sold the land to Darue.  Grable66 67
then brought a state-law quiet title action, claiming that Darue’s
notes 85-86.
60. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748-49 (2012) (citing Am. Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.)). The classic case
holding that a federally created claim did not “arise under” federal law is Shoshone Mining
Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1900), in which the Court rejected federal question
jurisdiction over a mining-rights claim created by a federal statute because the statute made
the claim turn upon local mining rules and customs, and state law.
61. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); see
also T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (noting that the
creation test articulated by Justice Holmes in American Well Works “is more useful for
inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended”).
62. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 785 (6th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 812 (1986); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1983); Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1936); Smith v. Kan. City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-201 (1921).
63. See infra Part II.B.
64. 545 U.S. 308.
65. 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 197
(3d ed. 2008). 
66. Grable, 545 U.S. at 310.
67. Id. at 310-11.
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title was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of the
seizure in the manner required by the federal tax code.68
The Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction over Grable’s
state-law claim. It first noted that, over the past century, it had
“sh[ied] away from the expansive view that mere need to apply
federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the ‘arising
under’ door.”  The Court made clear that it had instead “confin[ed]69
federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims to those that
‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy respect-
ing the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’”70
The Court then offered three reasons for upholding federal juris-
diction over Grable’s state-law claim. First, “the meaning of the
federal statute,” the notice provision of the tax code, was disputed.71
Second, the dispute over the statute’s meaning was “an important
issue of federal law that sensibly belong[ed] in a federal court”
because of the government’s interest in vindicating its tax-collection
activity and because federal judges are experienced with tax law.72
Finally, federal jurisdiction over cases like Grable would not upset
any balance between federal and state judicial responsibilities
“because it will be the rare state title case that raises a contested
matter of federal law.”73
One year later, in Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, the Supreme Court rejected federal jurisdiction over a
contract claim brought by Blue Cross Blue Shield against its in-
sured, seeking to recover money the insured had received in a tort
case against a third party.  The case potentially presented a federal74
issue because the insured was an employee of the federal govern-
ment, and the insurance contact was issued under a master contract
between Blue Cross and the government.  The Court, however,75
noted that the case did not fit the “special and small category” of
68. Id. at 311.
69. Id. at 313 (alteration in original).
70. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S.
561, 569 (1912)).
71. Id. at 315.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 547 U.S. 677, 683 (2006).
75. See id. at 688-89.
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state-law claims that arise under federal law.  It distinguished76
Grable because that case “presented a nearly ‘pure issue of law,’ one
‘that could be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern
numerous tax sale cases.’”  By contrast, the claim in Empire was77
“fact-bound and situation-specific.”  Thus, it could not “be squeezed78
into the slim category Grable exemplifies.”79
Taken together, Grable and Empire made clear that, to justify
federal jurisdiction, the federal issue should have wider importance
than the case at hand.  The cases also suggested that, to arise80
under federal law, a state-law claim should present a pure question
of federal law, and not merely require application of federal law to
facts.81
B. The Federal Circuit as a State Court
Grable and Empire were critically important decisions in the field
of federal jurisdiction.  The Federal Circuit, however, mostly dis-82
regarded both cases, holding that the interest in a uniform patent
law supported federal jurisdiction over many patent-related state-
law claims that required the court merely to apply patent law.  The83
court thus used its jurisdictional law to protect and enhance its
power relative to state courts. In the federalism relationship, the
Federal Circuit acted as a state court, deciding state-law claims and
76. Id. at 699.
77. Id. at 700.
78. Id. at 700-01.
79. Id. at 701.
80. See Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections of State and Federal Power: State Judges, Federal
Law, and the “Reliance Principle,” 81 TUL. L. REV. 283, 300 (2006).
81. See Christopher G. Wilson, Note, Embedded Federal Questions, Exclusive Jurisdiction,
and Patent-Based Malpractice Claims, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1237, 1259 (2009); see also
Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising
Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 337 (2007) (arguing that “[l]itigation focusing purely on
factual issues concerning federal law” presents a “less compelling” case for federal
jurisdiction).
82. See 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 3562.
83. See, e.g., Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(Dyk, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (contending that the “serious federal
interest” required by Grable is “ensuring that federal patent law questions are correctly and
uniformly resolved ..., even when the patent law issue is case-specific”).
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determining the content of state law.  As above, some background84
on jurisdictional law in patent cases is helpful to understanding this
analysis. 
Section 1338(a) of the Judicial Code grants the federal district
courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims and, unlike under the well-
pleaded complaint rule applicable to the general federal question
statute,  counterclaims “arising under” the patent laws.  Section85 86
1295(a)(1) grants the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over that same class of cases.  For the sake of “[l]inguistic con-87
sistency,” the Supreme Court has held that the “arising under”
language of the patent-specific jurisdictional statutes should be
interpreted identically to the general federal question statute.88
Exclusive jurisdiction under §§ 1295(a)(1) and 1338(a) thus extends
to cases in which (1) patent law creates the claim or (2) the claim
“necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal patent law.”  89
Before Grable and Empire, the Federal Circuit held that state-law
claims arose under patent law if the claims would require proof of
patent validity, enforceability, or infringement.  For example, in90
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., the court upheld
federal jurisdiction over a state-law claim of injurious falsehood
84. See, e.g., Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, 676 F.3d 1354,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reversing dismissal of a fraud claim filed against patent attorneys
“because under California equitable tolling law, the state law fraud claim was timely filed”).
85. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
86. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2012), which states, “The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents
.... No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents.” Congress added the second sentence to § 1338 in 2011 to
overrule Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830
(2002), in which the Supreme Court held that a case does not arise under patent law, and is
therefore not subject to exclusive federal or Federal Circuit jurisdiction, if the only patent-law
claims are counterclaims. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a),
125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011).
87. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (granting the Federal Circuit “exclusive jurisdiction ... of an
appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States ... in any civil action arising
under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising
under, any Act of Congress relating to patents”).
88. Holmes Grp., 535 U.S. at 829-30.
89. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988).
90. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent
Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 277-79 (2003).
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because the case turned on whether the defendant correctly
represented that its patents were valid and enforceable.  Similarly,91
in Additive Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.,
the court held that federal jurisdiction existed over a state-law claim
of business disparagement because the case turned on whether the
plaintiff’s product infringed the defendant’s patent.  Cases like92
Hunter Douglas and Additive Controls were hard to square with the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Grable and Empire because the
patent-related state-law claims did not present pure issues of patent
law; they merely required the application of patent law to particular
factual circumstances. But rather than cabin the scope of federal
and Federal Circuit authority over state-created claims, the Federal
Circuit expanded it, most notably in the context of state-law claims
for legal malpractice. 
Embedded federal issues are common in malpractice litigation
because of the causation requirement usually imposed by state law.
The plaintiff is often required to prove that, but for the attorney’s
error, the plaintiff would have been successful, or would have
enjoyed greater success, in the underlying matter.  If the underly-93
ing matter was patent litigation or patent prosecution, this “case
within a case” will raise questions such as the following: Would the
plaintiff have won its infringement suit but for the attorney’s
negligence? Would the PTO have issued a patent, or a patent with
different claims, had the attorney not been negligent? 
Until the mid-1990s, “malpractice suits against patent attorneys
were,” according to one commentator, “virtually unknown.”  When94
these cases did arise, state courts usually resolved them.  But some95
courts disagreed.  One of the earliest district court decisions to find96
91. 153 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
92. 986 F.2d 476, 478-79 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
93. See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:5 (2012).
94. A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: An Oxymoron No More, 2004 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 1, 2. For a discussion of the reasons why malpractice claims against patent
attorneys were rare until the 1990s and have increased in the past two decades, see Sean B.
Seymore, The Competency of State Courts to Adjudicate Patent-Based Malpractice Claims, 34
AIPLA Q.J. 443, 444-46 (2006).
95. 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 93, § 31:7, at 462-63; see, e.g., New Tek Mfg., Inc. v.
Beehner, 702 N.W.2d 336, 346 (Neb. 2005).
96. See generally Michael Ena, Comment, Jurisdictional Issues in the Adjudication of
Patent Law Malpractice Cases in Light of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions, 19 FORDHAM
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exclusive federal jurisdiction over a state malpractice claim was Air
Measurement Technologies v. Hamilton.  In that case, the plaintiffs97
alleged that errors by their attorney forced them to settle infringe-
ment litigation below market value because the infringement
defendants were able to raise defenses that would not have existed
without their attorney’s errors.  Consistent with Hunter Douglas98
and Additive Controls, the court reasoned that, under Texas law,
the plaintiffs would be required to prove that they would have had
a valid infringement claim and that the infringement defendants
could not have established defenses to patent validity or enforce-
ability.  99
Amid this growing tension, the Federal Circuit asserted exclusive
federal jurisdiction over patent-related malpractice claims in 2007
in two decisions issued on the same day. The first case was an
appeal of the district court decision in Air Measurement.  The100
Federal Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction because, as part of the
case within a case, “the district court [would] have to adjudicate,
hypothetically, the merits of [an] infringement claim” untainted by
the attorney’s alleged negligence.  The court contended that101
“Grable did not hold that only state law claims that involve con-
structions of federal statute [sic] or pure questions of law belonged
in federal court.”  Rather, the court emphasized the “strong federal102
interest” in adjudicating the malpractice claim in federal court
“because patents are issued by a federal agency” and “federal judges
... have experience in claim construction and infringement
matters.”  “Under these circumstances,” the court wrote, “patent103
infringement justifies ‘resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope
of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.’”104
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 219, 241-47 (2008) (summarizing early jurisdictional case
law).
97. No. SA-03-CA-0541-RF, 2003 WL 22143276 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2003).
98. Id. at *1.
99. Id. at *2.
100. Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
101. Id. at 1269.
102. Id. at 1272.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005)).
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The same day, in Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski,
LLP, the court held that malpractice cases involving determinations
of the scope of patent claims also arise under federal law.  The105
alleged act of malpractice in Immunocept was the attorney’s use of
the transitional phrase “consisting of ” in one of the patent’s claims,
which would allow competitors to avoid infringement by simply
adding an additional element to their device.  The main point of106
dispute did not appear to be the legal implication of that phrase,
which is well settled, but rather the factual question of whether use
of the phrase was a mistake.  Regardless, the court ruled that the107
case arose under patent law because the plaintiff could not prevail
“without addressing claim scope.”  The court relied heavily on its108
own pre-Grable decisions and emphasized that “Congress’ intent to
remove non-uniformity in the patent law, as evidenced by” the
creation of the Federal Circuit, was “further indicium” that federal
jurisdiction was proper.109
In Gunn v. Minton, the Supreme Court rejected the jurisdic-
tional rules the Federal Circuit had articulated and applied in Air
Measurement, Immunocept, and many subsequent decisions.  In110
105. 504 F.3d 1281, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
106. See id. at 1283-86; see also Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d
1377, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The phrase ‘consisting of’ is a term of art in patent law
signifying restriction and exclusion .... [A] drafter uses the phrase ‘consisting of’ to mean ‘I
claim what follows and nothing else.’”).
107. See Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285 (“Because it is the sole basis of negligence, the
claim drafting error is a necessary element of the malpractice cause of action.... The parties,
however, dispute whether there was a drafting mistake.”).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1285-86.
110. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). For other post-Grable and post-Empire Federal Circuit
decisions upholding federal jurisdiction because the court would have to apply patent law in
adjudicating a state-law claim, see, for example, Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., 680 F.3d 1341, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (upholding federal jurisdiction because plaintiff was “required to establish
that, but for attorney negligence, he would have obtained valid claims of sufficient scope that
competitors could not easily avoid”); Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
LLP, 676 F.3d 1354, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Because the underlying question here is
whether Landmark would have been able to achieve patent protection for its invention absent
the alleged malpractice, there is a substantial question of patent law.”); USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery
Dennison Corp., 676 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (upholding Federal Circuit jurisdiction
when the plaintiff-client alleged that “the defendants’ malfeasance caused it to be denied a
patent” because, to recover damages, the plaintiff would be required to prove that “its
invention was patentable over the prior art”); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 450 F.
App’x 956, 959-61 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding federal jurisdiction when plaintiff sought to
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Gunn, the federal courts had held in patent infringement litigation
that a patent owned by Vernon Minton was invalid under the on-
sale bar of the Patent Act because Minton had leased his invention
to a brokerage firm more than one year before filing a patent appli-
cation.  Minton then sued his litigation attorneys for malpractice,111
claiming that the attorneys had been negligent by not arguing that
the patent fell within the experimental-use exception to the on-sale
bar.  A Texas state court reached the merits of Minton’s malprac-112
tice claim and granted summary judgment to the defendants, but
the Texas Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of juris-
diction.  Looking to Federal Circuit law for guidance, the court113
held that the embedded experimental-use issue triggered exclusive
federal patent jurisdiction.114
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that
“state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent matters
will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law.”  The Court115
acknowledged that, although Minton’s claim necessarily raised a
disputed patent issue—whether the experimental-use exception
prove that the PTO would have issued the patent without a particular limitation); Davis v.
Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a malpractice
claim based on a lawyer’s failure to obtain a patent fell within federal jurisdiction because the
court would have to determine if the plaintiff’s invention was patentable); and Touchcom, Inc.
v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (upholding federal jurisdiction when
the plaintiff was “required to show that, had [the defendants] not omitted a portion of the
source code from its application, the resulting U.S. patent would not have been held invalid”);
see also Carter v. ALK Holdings, Inc., 605 F.3d 1319, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that
a breach of fiduciary duty claim based upon violations of PTO regulations arose under federal
law). In contrast, Judge O’Malley wrote many opinions questioning the Federal Circuit’s
expansive approach to arising under jurisdiction. See Minkin, 680 F.3d at 1353 (O’Malley, J.,
concurring); Landmark Screens, LLC, 676 F.3d at 1367 (O’Malley, J., concurring); USPPS,
Ltd., 676 F.3d at 1350 (O’Malley, J., concurring); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676
F.3d at 1024, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);
Byrne, 450 F. App’x at 960-61 (authoring majority opinion that followed but questioning
Federal Circuit precedent).
111. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1060; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (on-sale bar).
112. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1060; see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1998)
(discussing the experimental-use exception).
113. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1060-61.
114. See Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. 2011) (“While we are not bound by the
holdings of the Federal Circuit, its opinions in Air Measurement and Immunocept are directly
on point with the issues and facts presented by Minton’s legal malpractice action.”), rev’d,
Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1059.
115. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
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applied to Minton’s lease of his invention—this issue was not
sufficiently important to the federal system as a whole to justify
federal arising under jurisdiction.  116
The Court offered several reasons why the federal interest in the
case was insufficient to support federal jurisdiction. First, the
patent issue raised by Minton’s malpractice claim—“[i]f Minton’s
lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use argument, would the
result in the patent infringement proceeding have been differ-
ent?”—was entirely “hypothetical” because Minton’s patent had
already been invalidated in “real-world” infringement litigation.117
Also, allowing state courts to decide patent-related malpractice suits
would not, in the Court’s view, undermine the uniformity of patent
law because “federal courts are … not bound by state court case-
within-a-case patent rulings.”  Moreover, unlike Grable, Gunn did118
not present any pure, novel questions of federal law.  In addition,119
although a state-court decision in a case-specific malpractice dispute
could, in theory, preclude a patent holder from asserting a patent in
subsequent infringement litigation, the Court explained that pre-
clusion affects only the parties and patents in the particular mal-
practice case and is not a sufficient federal interest to establish
federal jurisdiction.  The Court also emphasized that the federal120
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1067.
118. Id.
119. Id. In drawing this distinction, the Court appeared to suggest that, standing alone,
even a pure, novel question of federal law might not justify federal jurisdiction. Rather, the
Court implied that the question must also be unlikely to be resolved by a federal court
anytime soon. See id. (“If the [novel legal] question arises frequently, it will soon be resolved
within the federal system, laying to rest any contrary state court precedent; if it does not arise
frequently, it is unlikely to implicate substantial federal interests.”).
120. Id. at 1068. It was unclear whether any preclusive effects would flow from a
malpractice judgment in Gunn because Minton’s patent had already been held invalid in
infringement litigation. See id. (discussing Minton’s argument that a state-court judgment
would be preclusive in ongoing continuation patent application proceedings at the PTO).
Preclusive effects could flow from a state-court judgment if, for example, the theory of
malpractice was that the patent holder had settled infringement litigation for less than the
patent holder would have received had his attorneys not been negligent. The malpractice
court would then have to decide whether, but for the attorneys’ negligence, the patent owner
would have prevailed in the infringement case. In that case, unlike in Gunn, the patent would
not have been invalidated in the prior infringement litigation. The malpractice court,
however, could determine that the patent holder would not have prevailed in the infringement
litigation because, in the malpractice court’s view, the patent was invalid. This holding of
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courts’ relative familiarity with patent law, standing alone, did not
justify federal jurisdiction.  Finally, the Court noted that federal121
jurisdiction over patent-related legal malpractice claims would
upset the states’ “great” interest in “maintaining standards among
members of the licensed professions.”122
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gunn is an emphatic rejection of
the Federal Circuit’s position that practically all cases requiring
analysis of patent validity, enforceability, infringement, or scope are
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. As a consequence, state
courts will now decide contested patent issues and will likely issue
opinions on matters of patent law. For those who believe that patent
law currently suffers from a lack of percolating judicial decisions,123
this may be a positive result. The effects, however, may be limited
because the patent question in most malpractice cases will be a
backward-looking inquiry about what an infringement court or the
PTO would have done given the state of patent law at the time of
the alleged act of malpractice.  124
More broadly, Gunn raises interesting questions about the role of
the states in the patent system. For example, scholars and pol-
icymakers might begin to consider seriously whether the states, in
their capacity as laboratories of government, can effectively develop
or implement social policies that foster innovation.  125
A final question involves the distributive consequences of the
Court’s decision in Gunn. Many observers believe that state courts
favor malpractice plaintiffs and that defendant attorneys fare better
in federal court.  If this received wisdom holds true, Gunn may126
patent invalidity, although embedded within a malpractice case, could preclude the patent
holder from asserting new claims of patent infringement. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (holding that a patent holder may be estopped
to assert the validity of a patent that has been declared invalid in prior suit against a
different defendant).
121. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068.
122. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supra note 3, at 1622.
124. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067.
125. Cf. Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez-Faire, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 11-13), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2134284 (suggesting that “patent law is not necessarily immune to the benefits of federalism
and decentralized decision-making”).
126. See A. Samuel Oddi, Patent Attorney Malpractice: Case-Within-a-Case-Within-a-Case,
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contribute to further growth in the already burgeoning field of
patent-related legal malpractice litigation.127
C. Jurisdictional Expansion and Institutional Dynamics
This discussion of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional case law,
and the Supreme Court’s emphatic rejection of that case law, intro-
duces several themes in the analysis of the institutional dynamics
of the patent system that will recur throughout this Article. First,
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional case law illustrates how state
courts and other federal courts demonstrate great fealty to the
Federal Circuit on issues that touch on patent law. The Federal
Circuit’s reasoning in its pre-Gunn jurisdictional decisions was dif-
ficult to square with the Supreme Court’s opinions in Grable and
Empire, as I had argued in an earlier version of this Article.  The128
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional doctrine was also inconsistent with
many regional circuit decisions rejecting federal jurisdiction over
state-law claims that required the mere application of federal
law.  Yet most courts acquiesced to the Federal Circuit’s enhance-129
6 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 71, 134 (2012); see also Dutch D. Chung, Note, The Preclusive Effect
of State Court Adjudication of Patent Issues and the Federal Courts’ Choice of Preclusion
Laws, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 707, 707 & n.3 (2000) (noting that “some [patent malpractice]
plaintiffs may find state court to be a more favorable and convenient forum,” and discussing
research suggesting that civil plaintiffs fare better in state court and that civil defendants fare
better in federal court).
127. See supra note 94 (discussing growth in the amount of patent-related malpractice
litigation over the past decade).
128. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court 16-17 (July 19, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/
Gugliuzza,%20Paul%20- %20Paper.pdf; see also supra note 110 (discussing pre-Gunn opinions
by Federal Circuit Judge O’Malley that criticized the Federal Circuit’s approach to arising
under jurisdiction); infra note 133 (discussing state and federal case law disagreeing with the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional precedent).
129. See, e.g., Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“To be sure, the jury would have to apply federal law to reach its decision. But as the
Supreme Court explained in Grable, the federal courts have rejected the expansive view that
mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the arising under
door.” (internal citations omitted)); Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. Exclusive Gas
Storage Leasehold & Easement, 524 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting federal
jurisdiction when the court would not “need to resolve a disputed provision of the [Natural
Gas Act] in order to resolve [the plaintiff’s] state law conversion or negligence claims”);
Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 574 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The state court in
which the ... suit was lodged is competent to apply federal law, to the extent it is relevant, and
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ment of federal power. District courts assumed jurisdiction over
state-law claims involving hypothetical patents and hypothetical
infringement claims,  and state courts surrendered jurisdiction130
over those claims to the federal courts.  Although some courts131
distinguished the Federal Circuit’s decisions on their facts to avoid
would seem [suitably] positioned to determine [its] application ... in the present case.”
(quoting Empire Health Choice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 910, 912 (7th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting federal jurisdiction when the case presented “a fact-specific application
of rules that come from both federal and state law rather than a context-free inquiry into the
meaning of a federal law”); cf. Bender v. Jordan, 623 F.3d 1128, 1130-31 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(upholding federal jurisdiction when the case involved “a nearly pure issue of federal law ...
[a]nd the parties’ legal duties turn[ed] almost entirely on the proper interpretation of that
[law]”).
130. See, e.g., Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Zur Foerderung Der Wissenschaften E.V. v. Wolf
Greenfield & Sacks, PC, 661 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129-30 (D. Mass. 2009); see also USPPS, Ltd.
v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2011) (transferring a breach of
fiduciary duty case to the Federal Circuit, reasoning that the plaintiff “cannot prove causation
without proving the patentability of its invention”); Oddi, supra note 126, at 117-18, 120-21
(citing additional authority).
131. See, e.g., Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, 107 Cal. App. 3d
373, 382, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Premier Networks, Inc. v. Stadheim & Grear, Ltd., 918
N.E.2d 1117, 1120-22, 1124 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 642-47 (Tex.
2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); see also 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 93, § 31:7, at 476
(“Most state courts have purported to follow the Federal Circuit’s reasoning.”); Oddi, supra
note 126, at 124-25 (citing additional authority).
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exclusive federal jurisdiction,  or simply refused to follow the132
Federal Circuit,  those decisions seemed to be rarer.  133 134
Second, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional decisions illustrate
what has been termed patent law or Federal Circuit “excep-
tionalism,” referring to the Federal Circuit’s tendency to insist that
general legal principles, such as jurisdictional standards, do not
132. These factual distinctions were sometimes questionable. For example, a New Jersey
district court reasoned that the inquiry into patent validity would turn on whether and why
the attorneys missed deadlines—which were, incidentally, set by federal law—rather than on
whether the invention met the substantive requirements of patentability, such as novelty,
nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure. See Genelink Biosciences, Inc. v. Colby, 722 F.
Supp. 2d 592, 600 (D.N.J. 2010); see also E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. Moses & Singer, LLP, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 516, 523-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff
would not have to “prove what the proper outcome of the federal litigation should have been”
but only that “there was no reasonable possibility of prevailing in the federal action”). Other
frequent grounds of distinction included pointing out alternative, nonpatent theories that
would permit recovery, see, e.g., Danner, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, No. CV09-1220-JE,
2010 WL 2608294, at *3 (D. Or. June 23, 2010); Eddings v. Glast, Phillips & Murray, No. 3:07-
CV-1512-L, 2008 WL 2522544, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2008); see also ClearPlay, Inc. v.
Abecassis, 602 F.3d 1364, 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (transferring to the Eleventh Circuit
a case involving various state-law claims because each claim contained a “theory of relief that
would not require the resolution of a patent law issue”), and noting that any patent issue was
not “disputed,” see, e.g., Magnetek, Inc. v. Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, 954 N.E.2d 803, 819 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2011), appeal allowed, 962 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. 2011); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (transferring to the Tenth Circuit
a breach-of-license case because the underlying question of infringement was not disputed).
133. See, e.g., Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, P.L.L.C., 666 F. Supp. 2d 749, 751-
52 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (noting that Grable made clear that “there is no ‘single, precise, all-
embracing’ test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims” but that “the
Federal Circuit appears to impose precisely such an all-embracing test, effectively aggregating
ever greater swaths of state-law claims into its jurisdictional sweep” (citations omitted)),
vacated, 631 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011); New Tek Mfg., Inc. v. Beehner, 751 N.W.2d 135, 144
(Neb. 2008) (“We reiterate our determination in New Tek I[, 702 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 2005)], that
this professional malpractice case arises entirely under state law.”); see also Singh v. Duane
Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to follow Air Measurement in a
trademark case, noting that the Federal Circuit did not consider “the federal interest” in the
case and “the effect on federalism” of assuming jurisdiction); Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 652
(Guzman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has not remained faithful to the Supreme
Court’s federalism inquiry in the context of malpractice decisions arising from patent cases....
[U]nder the Federal Circuit’s approach, the federalism element is simply an invocation of the
need for uniformity in patent law.”).
134. See generally Paul M. Janicke, The Patent Malpractice Thicket, or Why Justice Holmes
Was Right, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 437, 469-76 (2012) (discussing judicial opinions rejecting the
notion that “state-created causes of action for legal malpractice [should be] shuttled off to
federal courts for exclusive handling merely because issues of patent law [were] embedded in
the cases”).
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apply in patent cases because patent law is “different.”  The135
Supreme Court had already rejected patent law exceptionalism in
cases addressing declaratory judgment standing,  remedies for136
patent infringement,  and review of administrative agencies.137 138
Gunn can be viewed as another salvo in the Court’s battle against
patent law exceptionalism, as the decision brought Federal Circuit
jurisdictional law in line with the prevailing view in the regional
circuits  and rejected the notion that the need for uniformity in139
patent law justified a special jurisdictional rule for patent cases.140
Third, by asserting exclusive jurisdiction over patent-related
state-law claims, the Federal Circuit solidified its position as the
expert patent institution, excluding state courts from developing
patent-related law. As discussed below, the Federal Circuit has
similarly limited the authority of a potentially expert agency, the
PTO,  and has also inhibited trial courts from developing patent-141
law expertise.142
Fourth, the federalism relationship provides an initial example
of the Federal Circuit shifting roles. The Federal Circuit is a federal
appellate court with near-exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.
Because of the exclusive jurisdiction it asserted over patent-related
135. Cf. Oskar Liivak, Essay, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy to Intellectual
Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1173 (2012) (discussing the view that “normal intuitions about
private property” do not apply to intellectual property); Kelly Casey Mullally et al., The New
Private Ordering of Intellectual Property: The Emergence of Contracts as the Drivers of
Intellectual Property Rights, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 59, 59 (2009) (discussing “patent law
exceptionalism” regarding rules of declaratory-judgment standing). Fields perceived as
“specialized,” such as patent and tax law, seem particularly prone to exceptionalist
approaches. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1541-42 (2006); see also Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn
A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384,
424-45 (2012) (criticizing the institutional design of the bankruptcy system, which, like the
patent system, lacks a regulatory agency).
136. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 & n.11 (2007).
137. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006).
138. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); see also infra Part III.A. See generally Paul
R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1220 (2011) (discussing Federal Circuit
exceptionalism in both patent and nonpatent cases).
139. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
140. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1067 (2013).
141. See infra Part III.A.
142. See infra Part IV.A.
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state-law cases, it also assumed a role state courts typically play:
shaping the contours of state law.
Finally, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional cases illustrate how
the court relies heavily on the policy of uniformity in patent law to
displace the authority of other institutions. Uniformity was a major
reason Congress created the court. Repeated emphasis on unifor-
mity, however, raises questions about whether the drive to carry out
that mission distorts other policy goals the court might reasonably
seek, such as enhancing the efficiency of the litigation process or, in
the case of malpractice claims, permitting state courts to develop
their own law on important nonpatent issues such as the duty of
care, statutes of limitations, and damages.
Although the Supreme Court in Gunn rejected the Federal
Circuit’s displacement of state jurisdiction over malpractice claims,
controversy within the federalism relationship is likely to endure.
The Federal Circuit may now be more reluctant to uphold federal
jurisdiction based on embedded patent issues, but state law remains
relevant even to patent disputes that clearly arise under federal
law, for state law sometimes governs matters of contract law and
patent ownership that arise in, for example, infringement litigation.
According to recent opinions by some Federal Circuit judges, the
court has improperly leveraged choice-of-law doctrine to expand the
scope of federal common law and restrict the scope of state contract
law.  This dispute over choice of law might be the next doctrinal143
battle within the Federal Circuit’s federalism relationship.144
143. See, e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 672 F.3d 1239, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The panel majority’s creation of
federal common law to govern assignments of existing patents conflicts not only with our
precedent, but with longstanding Supreme Court precedent restricting judicial preemption
of state law.”); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(dismissing patent infringement suit for lack of standing because, under Federal Circuit law,
a contract did not effectively assign ownership of the patent to the plaintiff); id. at 1368
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“New York law applies to these sales and transfer agreements. All
of the documents state, and the parties and the district court agree, that the Asset Purchase
Agreement and all of the related agreements are governed by New York law…. [M]y
colleagues do not dispute that when New York law is applied, the district court’s decision on
standing should be upheld.”).
144. Cf. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2202-03 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (not discussing the choice-of-law issue, but
criticizing the Federal Circuit’s rules for interpreting contracts to assign patent rights). 
1820 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1791
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
The Federal Circuit has also exercised broad power relative to the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government. In this
separation of powers relationship, Federal Circuit doctrines of both
administrative law and substantive patent law curtail the ability of
institutions, such as the PTO and Congress, to influence the patent
system. 
A. The Federal Circuit as Agency Administrator
The PTO is a weak administrative agency.  Some of this weak-145
ness is due to Congress. Although many administrative agencies
have broad statutory power to promulgate rules in the public
interest,  the PTO’s rule-making power is, according to the Federal146
Circuit’s interpretation of the Patent Act, mostly limited to adopting
regulations to govern proceedings at the PTO.  Some scholars have147
questioned the Federal Circuit’s law on this issue, arguing that the
Patent Act “has long given the PTO specific rulemaking powers that
readily encompass substantive rulemaking.”  In addition, there are148
many other examples of how Federal Circuit administrative law
doctrine further weakens the PTO. 
1. Denial of Deference to Fact-Finding
The Federal Circuit gives minimal deference to PTO fact-finding.
Issues of fact are often critical to the PTO’s patentability determina-
tion because some of the Patent Act’s most important requirements
have significant factual components, such as the requirement that
145. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 1041, 1051 (2011).
146. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (empowering the Federal Communications
Commission to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public
interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter”).
147. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he broadest
of the PTO’s rulemaking powers ... authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations
directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does NOT grant the Commissioner
the authority to issue substantive rules.” (alteration in original)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)
(2006) (outlining the PTO’s rule-making authority).
148. Tran, supra note 3, at 838-39.
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the claimed invention not be obvious given existing technology.149
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), courts review
findings of fact from formal agency proceedings under a substantial
evidence standard but review fact-finding in informal proceedings
under a more deferential arbitrary or capricious standard.150
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit long denied that the APA even
applied to the PTO. Instead, the court applied the clearly erroneous
standard to factual issues resolved by the PTO in patent application
proceedings.  This doctrine was unusual because appellate courts151
typically apply the clear-error standard when reviewing fact-finding
by lower courts,  not agencies.  Also, the clear-error standard is152 153
usually considered to allow more rigorous judicial review than
either of the APA standards.  Accordingly, the court reasoned that154
clear-error review was necessary to promote uniformity in patent
adjudication.  155
In 1999, the Supreme Court rejected this line of Federal Circuit
case law, however, and held that the APA applies to judicial review
of PTO fact-finding.  Yet Federal Circuit administrative law still156
provides for significant judicial control over the PTO. For example,
the Supreme Court did not make clear which APA standard applies
to PTO fact-finding: the arbitrary or capricious standard or the
substantial evidence standard. Although some question whether the
standards differ at all,  the Federal Circuit has stated that the157
149. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (“While the ultimate
question of patent validity is one of law, the [nonobviousness requirement] ... lends itself to
several basic factual inquiries.... [T]he scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.” (citations omitted)).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2006).
151. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d sub nom.
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
153. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 976 (5th ed.
2010).
154. See id. § 11.2, at 977-78.
155. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1458 (asserting that the clear-error standard “promote[s]
consistency between our review of the patentability decisions of the [PTO] and the district
courts in infringement litigation”).
156. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 152.
157. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (“We have noted on several
occasions that the distinction between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or
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substantial evidence standard is less deferential.  Perhaps not sur-158
prisingly, the Federal Circuit has applied the substantial evidence
standard to PTO fact-finding,  making the Agency decision more159
susceptible to reversal on appeal.  160
2. Deciding New Issues on Appeal
Another way in which the Federal Circuit enhances its power at
the expense of the PTO is through the court’s willingness to decide
legal questions not considered by the Agency. For example, in In re
Comiskey, the PTO rejected a patent application solely on the
ground of obviousness.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the161
rejection but did not consider obviousness. Rather, the court sua
sponte held that some of the claims did not recite patentable subject
matter and remanded other claims to the PTO so that the Agency
could consider in the first instance whether those claims recited
patentable subject matter.  This ruling is arguably in tension with162
SEC v. Chenery Corp., in which the Supreme Court held that a court
may usually affirm administrative action only on the grounds relied
upon by the agency.  In an opinion dissenting from the denial of163
rehearing en banc, Judge Moore expressed dismay over the court’s
arrogation of power over the PTO:
Our task is to review a PTO decision, not to direct its exami-
nation. Section 144 of the Patent Act states that our court “shall
review the decision ... on the record before the Patent and
Trademark Office.” Our court is now apparently doing more
than reviewing on the record; it is directing the examination,
capricious test is ‘largely semantic.’”). See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 153, § 7.5 (discussing
conflicting case law).
158. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
159. See id. at 1313-14.
160. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 52, at 290-92 (citing In re Beasley, 117 F. App’x 739
(Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
161. See 554 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
162. Id. at 973. The patentable subject matter requirement stems from the provision of the
Patent Act that permits patents to be issued on “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
163. 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943); see Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229,
269-74 (2013).
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failing to review the decision the PTO has rendered and telling
it what alternative possible ground of rejection should be
evaluated. With all due respect, I do not believe that we have a
roving commission to manage the examination process.164
Comiskey is not the only recent case in which the court has af-
firmed a PTO rejection on new grounds.  This emerging practice165
of, essentially, ignoring the decision on review is another illustra-
tion of Federal Circuit exceptionalism. As a consequence, the appel-
late court has addressed difficult questions of law and policy in the
first instance. Although this practice could potentially be justified
if it saved the PTO from dealing with a remand, Comiskey illus-
trates that a remand sometimes remains necessary. The court thus
acts not as an appellate court, reviewing the decision of an inferior
tribunal, but as an agency administrator, dictating the issues the
PTO must consider.  In addition, by ignoring the PTO decision on166
review, the court sometimes addresses important issues on a record
that poorly illuminates them, raising the possibility that the court
will not sufficiently understand the potential consequences of its
decision. 
B. How the Executive Branch Pushes Back
In the separation of powers relationship, as in the federalism
relationship, Federal Circuit doctrine has impeded other govern-
ment institutions from shaping patent law. In the federalism rela-
tionship, this impediment was largely complete until the Supreme
Court decided Gunn because federal patent jurisdiction is exclusive
of state courts, and the state courts that did encounter embedded
164. In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400, at *26 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13,
2009) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
165. See In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding a patent denial
on the grounds of indefiniteness when the PTO had based its determination of unpatentability
on anticipation). Similarly, the court recently held that parties who seek review of a PTO
decision in a district court, rather than directly in the Federal Circuit, may introduce evidence
that was not considered by the PTO. See Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012); see also 35 U.S.C. § 145 (creating a civil action
to obtain a patent).
166. For a comprehensive treatment of the Federal-Circuit-as-administrative-agency
analogy, see Kumar, supra note 163; see also Ryan Vacca, Acting like an Administrative
Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 744-49 (2011) (analogizing the
Federal Circuit’s en banc process to administrative rule making).
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patent issues mostly ceded authority to the federal courts and the
Federal Circuit.  In the separation of powers relationship, how-167
ever, the court faces formidable counterweights in the other
branches of the federal government. 
Although the PTO has no authority to promulgate rules that
interpret the Patent Act, and its factual findings receive minimal
deference, courts sometimes give weight to the Agency’s long-
standing practice. For example, the PTO compiles the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure,  which summarizes court-developed168
law to “provide[ ] page after page of painstaking instruction on how
substantive patent law doctrines should be applied in the context of
patent examination.”  Although the manual does not have the169
force of law, examiners and patent applicants rely heavily on its
guidance, and it is frequently cited by courts as persuasive auth-
ority.  As another example of the weight given to the PTO’s170
established practices, the Federal Circuit, in its recent high-profile
decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. PTO (Myriad),
supported its holding that isolated DNA molecules are patent
eligible by citing “the longstanding practice of the PTO,” which had
issued patents on DNA for nearly thirty years.  Concurring, Judge171
Moore similarly noted that “we must be particularly wary of ex-
panding the judicial exception to patentable subject matter where
both settled expectations and extensive property rights are in-
volved.”  172
Also, the executive branch influences patent law by participating
in litigation. The Solicitor General has been remarkably successful
in convincing the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the
Federal Circuit and in winning on the merits in cases that do reach
167. See Janicke, supra note 134, at 469-71 (discussing state-court jurisdictional rulings
in the wake of Air Measurement and Immunocept).
168. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001, rev. Aug. 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html.
169. Golden, supra note 145, at 1047.
170. See id. at 1047-48 & nn.32-33 (providing examples); see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (adopting the approach set forth in the PTO’s Utility Examination
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001), for determining whether nucleotide sequences
satisfy the utility requirement of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101).
171. 689 F.3d 1303, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
172. Id. at 1343 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
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the Court. From 1996 to 2007, the Solicitor General participated as
a party or an amicus in thirteen patent cases. In nine of those cases,
the Solicitor General supported a different result than that reached
by the Federal Circuit, and, in each of those cases, the Supreme
Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s position.  In many cases,173
the Solicitor General was advised by the PTO, as well as other
executive and independent agencies.174
However, the Solicitor General’s winning streak in the Supreme
Court recently ended.  Moreover, the Solicitor General does not175
always act as a simple mouthpiece for the PTO. In Myriad, for
instance, the Department of Justice filed a brief in the Federal
Circuit urging a position different from the PTO’s “longstanding
position ... that isolated DNA molecules are patent eligible.”176
Nevertheless, by participating in patent litigation the executive
branch can influence important issues in patent law.  177
Finally, the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) empowers the PTO
to push back against the Federal Circuit. The AIA created several
important new PTO proceedings. In postrant review proceedings,
the PTO will accept third-party challenges to a patent’s validity for,
in most cases, up to nine months after the patent issues.  The Act178
also strengthened inter partes review proceedings, which permit
third parties to challenge a patent’s novelty or nonobviousness at
the PTO throughout the patent’s term;  created a supplemental179
examination process, which will permit a patent holder to submit
173. See Duffy, supra note 52, at 540.
174. See Long, supra note 3, at 1972 & n.22 (noting that “the PTO has [recently] boasted
of its role in advising the Solicitor General’s Office as to whether the Supreme Court should
grant certiorari [in] patent cases coming out of the Federal Circuit,” and citing the PTO’s
annual reports).
175. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV.
747, 766-67 (2013) (reviewing CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (2012)) (noting that,
since the 2010 Term, the Solicitor General has lost “two of the three cases in which the
Solicitor General and the Federal Circuit clearly disagreed” and that, in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), the Solicitor General
unsuccessfully defended the Federal Circuit’s judgment).
176. See Myriad, 689 F.3d at 1326.
177. See Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1245-48 (2012).
178. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(d), 125 Stat. 284, 306
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321).
179. See id. § 6(a) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311).
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information relevant to the patent that the PTO did not consider
during the original prosecution;  and introduced derivation pro-180
ceedings, which will replace interference proceedings and determine
which of two or more parties is entitled to the patent for the same
invention under the new first-to-file priority rule.  181
To implement these proceedings, Congress empowered the PTO
to make rules that arguably represent policy making.  For182
example, the AIA states that the PTO may not initiate postgrant
review unless it is “more likely than not that at least [one] of the
[challenged] claims ... is unpatentable.”  In contrast to the PTO’s183
previously limited power, the AIA gives the Agency authority to
interpret this statute: “The Director shall prescribe regulations ...
setting forth the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds to
institute a [postgrant] review.”  In addition, many other provisions184
of the Act empower the PTO to set “standards” for conducting the
new proceedings.  The legislative history also evinces an “inten[t]”185
for the PTO to use these new proceedings “to address potential
abuses and current inefficiencies” in the patent system, setting a
clear policy goal for the PTO’s rule making.  Moreover, at least one186
scholar has argued that PTO interpretations of the Patent Act that
occur during the new postgrant and inter partes review proceedings
should be entitled to Chevron deference,  a marked departure from187
current law in which the Federal Circuit reviews de novo PTO
interpretations of the Patent Act.  188
180. See id. § 12(a) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257). This mechanism will allow patent
owners to potentially avoid, in subsequent litigation, allegations that they failed to disclose
important information to the PTO, which can lead a court to hold the patent unenforceable
under the inequitable conduct doctrine. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649
F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
181. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(i) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135); see also
id. § 3(b)(1) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)) (new priority rule).
182. See Tran, supra note 4, at 615-16.
183. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6(d) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 324(a)).
184. Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(2)).
185. See Tran, supra note 4, at 599-600, 618-19 (noting that the PTO is empowered to
prescribe, among other things, “standards for the conduct of derivation proceedings” and
“standards for the showing of sufficient grounds to institute” inter partes review).
186. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 (2011).
187. See Wasserman, supra note 4, 1977-78; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that courts must defer to an agency’s
“permissible construction” of a statute it administers).
188. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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It remains to be seen how these statutory changes will affect the
power dynamics between the PTO and the Federal Circuit. Still,
even under the AIA, the PTO lacks authority to issue rules inter-
preting the core requirements of the Patent Act, such as novelty and
nonobviousness, and its legal interpretations in patent application
denials, which are the typical form of PTO appeal to the Federal
Circuit, receive no deference. Consequently, policy power in the field
of patent law may remain mostly with the Federal Circuit. Although
the PTO can sometimes influence patent law through both formal
and informal mechanisms, it is still a relatively weak power broker
compared to the court.
C. The Federal Circuit as a Legislature
One might think that the Federal Circuit’s relationship with
Congress would lack give-and-take. After all, if Congress disagrees
with how the Federal Circuit has articulated patent law, Congress
can simply overrule the court.  Yet changes in Federal Circuit law189
have often tracked pending legislative proposals, resulting in an
indirect dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches. 
For example, in 2008, the Federal Circuit—for the first time
ever—ordered a district court to transfer a patent case to a more
convenient forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  At the time, pro-190
posals were pending in Congress to amend the venue statute for
patent cases,  in response to complaints about the prevalence of191
forum shopping in patent litigation.  Interestingly, the AIA con-192
tains minimal revisions to the venue rules.  193
189. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2006) (granting a generic drug applicant sued
for patent infringement the right to assert a counterclaim challenging patent information
provided to the FDA by the branded manufacturer), overruling Mylan Pharms., Inc. v.
Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
190. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (2006) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought.”).
191. See, e.g., S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (2009).
192. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 43, at 891-94.
193. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 9(a), 125 Stat. 284, 316
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 145) (changing the venue for district court challenges to
PTO decisions from the District of Columbia to the Eastern District of Virginia).
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Also, the court recently increased its scrutiny of damage awards
in patent cases, reversing awards as unsupported by the evidence194
and rejecting the “25 percent rule” as a starting point for reasonable
royalty damage calculations.  Prior to these decisions, provisions195
had been percolating in Congress to limit damages to the economic
value attributable to the patent’s specific improvement on the prior
art  and to require courts to specifically identify the methodologies196
or factors for calculating damages.  The AIA, by contrast, contains197
no significant amendment to patent damages law.198
This interbranch dialogue is remarkable not only as a descriptive
matter. Examining the consequences of the conversation between
the Federal Circuit and Congress, Dan Burk has suggested that
judicial engagement with these and other contentious issues of
patent law may have enabled the AIA to overcome the interest-
group dynamics that had flustered previous efforts at legislative
patent reform.199
D. Competition for Patent Power: Institutional Themes         
Reconsidered
Despite this interbranch competition to influence patent policy,
a strong claim can be made that power over the field is consolidated
in the Federal Circuit. Although some of this consolidation might be
attributed to Congress, which has not granted the PTO broad law-
making power, the Federal Circuit has also developed doctrine that
limits PTO authority. As in the federalism relationship, some of this
doctrine, such as the court’s willingness to address issues that the
194. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
195. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Patent
Act mandates that, upon finding infringement, the court must award damages that are “in
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
196. See S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007).
197. See S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009).
198. As another example of the Federal Circuit’s responsiveness to pending patent reform
legislation, compare In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc),
which overruled Federal Circuit case law requiring a patent holder to seek the advice of
counsel to avoid a finding of willful infringement, with H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005), and
S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4(a) (2007), which were legislative proposals to overrule this
affirmative duty.
199. See Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons Learned, REGULATION,
Winter 2012-13, at 20, 22.
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PTO never considered, might be on a collision course with Supreme
Court cases limiting judicial review to matters considered by the
Agency. Likewise, the court’s behavior in the separation of powers
relationship embodies the institutional themes discussed above.200
The court’s refusal to apply the APA to the PTO and its avoidance
of Chenery are examples of patent-law exceptionalism. Also, the
Federal Circuit has again shifted forms. In the federalism relation-
ship, the court acted as a state court, defining the contours of state
tort law.  In the separation of powers relationship, the court has201
acted as an agency administrator by dictating the course of patent
examination and refusing deference to the PTO.  The court has202
also adopted the role of a legislature, developing patent rules that
respond to proposals pending in Congress.203
In addition, limits on the power of the PTO solidify the Federal
Circuit’s position as the only expert patent institution. In the
federalism relationship, one might defend the curtailment of state-
court jurisdiction by arguing that those institutions are poorly
equipped to apply patent law because they so rarely hear patent
cases.  In the separation of powers relationship, however, the cur-204
tailment of PTO authority is more remarkable because the Agency
has deep, on-the-ground experience with patent law and adjud-
ication, even if it is not currently designed to be a policy-making
200. See supra Part II.C.
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. See supra Part III.A.
203. One might also cite the Federal Circuit’s oft-discussed penchant for developing broad,
bright-line rules as similar to legislation or administrative rule making. See Kumar, supra
note 163, at 255-57 (comparing the Federal Circuit to an administrative agency).
204. See Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (noting that determining the scope of patent claims “is a question of law that can be
complex in that it may involve many claim construction doctrines” and arguing that, in cases
involving patent issues embedded within state-created claims, “[l]itigants will benefit from
federal judges who are used to handling these complicated rules”); Air Measurement Techs.,
Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(arguing that litigants in cases involving patent issues embedded within state-created claims
“will … benefit from federal judges who have experience in claim construction and
infringement matters”). But see Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013) (“[W]e [cannot]
accept the suggestion that the federal courts’ greater familiarity with patent law means that
legal malpractice cases like this one belong in federal court .... [T]he possibility that a state
court will incorrectly resolve a state claim is not, by itself, enough to trigger the federal courts’
exclusive patent jurisdiction, even if the potential error finds its root in a misunderstanding
of patent law.” (citations omitted)).
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entity.  In the next relationship in this Article’s taxonomy—the205
relationship between the Federal Circuit and trial-level patent
infringement tribunals—the court has also limited the authority of
other institutions that are well positioned to develop patent exper-
tise.
IV. THE VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, THE
DISTRICT COURTS, AND THE ITC
The Federal Circuit has also assumed a powerful role in its
vertical relationship with the district courts and the ITC by ag-
gressively reviewing fact-driven and discretionary decisions. In
addition, this institutional behavior implicates important critiques
of the current patent system, such as the unpredictability of patent
litigation.
A. The Federal Circuit and the District Courts
The final two relationships this Article studies, the vertical and
horizontal, focus mostly on the Federal Circuit’s interactions with
other federal courts: the district courts and the regional circuits. In
its relationship with the district courts, the subject of this Part, the
Federal Circuit has developed standards of appellate review and
rules of appellate practice and procedure that enhance the court’s
authority over the patent system. In its relationship with the
regional circuits, the subject of the next Part, the court has adopted
choice-of-law rules and rules of appellate jurisdiction that also
enhance the Federal Circuit’s power relative to other courts. 
Early Federal Circuit cases suggested the court might take a
modest role with respect to the district courts. For example, the
court reasoned it had less power than the regional circuits to
205. See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 508
(2012) (noting that the PTO has a limited policy and economic staff but arguing that the
Agency has actually served as an effective policymaker); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 2012
(noting that “the PTO has never employed a large number of policy-oriented thinkers or
economists” but that “the Agency has recently made strides to rectify this shortcoming” by,
for example, creating an Office of the Chief Economist in 2010); see also Richard L. Revesz,
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1168
(1990) (arguing that patent-law reform should focus on the administrative law-making system
because of its ability to achieve uniformity without introducing the pathologies of specialized
appellate courts).
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entertain interlocutory appeals, that is, appeals from orders that do
not conclude the district court case, because the court had “no
general supervisory authority over district courts.”  This view was206
remarkable because Congress gave the Federal Circuit the same
power as the regional circuits to hear interlocutory appeals of
injunctions and controlling questions of law, two of the most com-
monly invoked exceptions to the final-judgment rule.  The Federal207
Circuit, however, no longer seems to view its authority over district
courts as limited. Rather, the court has shaped patent law’s stan-
dards of appellate review to give itself plenary power to resolve
many important substantive issues. The court has also developed
rules of appellate jurisdiction and procedure that give it significant
control over the conduct of district court litigation. 
1. Enhancing Power Through Patent Law: The Federal Circuit
as a Fact-Finder
The differing institutional competencies of trial and appellate
courts shape the standards of review on appeal. Appellate courts
review questions of law de novo because they have more time to
research the issues, because their multijudge panels permit collegial
discussion and collective judgment, and because a key function of
appellate review is to permit uniform development of the law.  In208
contrast, appellate courts defer to trial court fact-finding because of
the trial court’s familiarity with and proximity to the evidence and
testimony.209
In patent cases, the Federal Circuit has cast many important
issues as questions of law, rather than questions of fact, enhancing
the court’s authority over district courts. The most notable area in
which the court has treated arguably factual matters as legal
questions is claim construction.  Determining exactly what patent210
claims mean is the most important task in a patent case, for the
206. Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
207. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 125, 96 Stat. 25,
36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2006)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), (b) (granting the
regional circuits appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders relating to injunctions and
controlling questions of law).
208. J. ERIC SMITHBURN, APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS 8 (2009).
209. Id. at 8-9.
210. See David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents,
26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1167-72 (2011). 
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claims’ meaning will often determine whether the accused product
or method infringes. As Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit has
bluntly explained, “to decide what the claims mean is nearly always
to decide the case.”  211
Because the Federal Circuit treats claim construction as a ques-
tion of law, it is not surprising that, according to the court, the
analysis should focus on “intrinsic evidence”: the claim language at
issue, other claims in the patent, the patent’s specification, and the
prosecution history.  Yet the court has also acknowledged that212
extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, scientific treatises, and
dictionaries, can be relevant.  It makes sense for the court to con-213
sider extrinsic evidence in interpreting patent claims because the
claims are interpreted from the perspective of a person “of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the invention,”  and the district judge214
will likely be unfamiliar with the pertinent technology.  Claim215
construction therefore often involves extensive technology tutorials
along with expert testimony and declarations about who qualifies as
a person of ordinary skill in the art and what the claims would
mean to that person.  216
Evaluating this evidence would seem to be a fact-finding task,
and it would seem that the district court’s determination should
receive some deference on appeal. But the Federal Circuit has re-
jected both of those premises. In Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., the court held that claim construction is a matter of law to be
determined by the judge and not a jury.  The Supreme Court217
affirmed, holding that the Seventh Amendment did not require
claim construction to be performed by juries.  Yet the Court also218
suggested that claim construction was a “mongrel practice” that was
211. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
212. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The
specification is the drawings and detailed description of the invention, which precedes the
patent claims, and the prosecution history is the correspondence between the applicant and
the PTO during the application process.
213. See id. at 1317.
214. Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
215. See S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century:
Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 77.
216. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1332 (Mayer, J., dissenting); PETER S. MENELL ET AL., FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 5-16 to -24 (2d ed. 2012).
217. Markman, 52 F.3d at 970-71.
218. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
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neither a purely legal matter nor a matter of fact.  Accordingly,219
commentators—and many Federal Circuit judges—have suggested
that lower courts should receive deference for their claim construc-
tion rulings.  The Federal Circuit, however, has insisted on220
reviewing district court claim construction orders de novo, with no
deference given.  Again invoking its mission, the court has em-221
phasized that its “role in providing national uniformity to the con-
struction of a patent claim ... would be impeded if [it] were bound to
give deference to a trial judge’s asserted factual determinations
incident to claim construction.”222
As this Article was going to press, the Federal Circuit agreed to
reconsider en banc its case law giving no deference to district court
claim construction.  For good reason: the Federal Circuit’s223
searching appellate review may have serious consequences for the
patent system. As an empirical matter, numerous studies have
documented the high rate at which the Federal Circuit overturns
district court claim construction orders.  The most reliable studies224
have calculated the figure to be about 30 percent, whereas the over-
all rate for civil appeals in the federal courts appears to be less than
20 percent.  Although there is evidence that claim construction225
219. Id. at 378, 388.
220. See Donald R. Dunner, Time to Revisit the “No Deference” Cybor Rule, LANDSLIDE,
Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 11; Jeffrey Peabody, Under Construction: Towards a More Deferential
Standard of Review in Claim Construction Cases, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 505, 520 (2008); Thomas
Chen, Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165,
1168 (2008); see also Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1373 (O’Malley,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Phillips, 415 F.3d
at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
221. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
222. Id. at 1455.
223. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2012-1014, 2013 WL
1035092 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2013).
224. See Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and
Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
981, 995-1001 (2010) (summarizing the empirical studies).
225. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239 (2005) (finding that, in Federal Circuit cases
from 1996 through 2003 in which claim construction was at issue, the court held that the
district court incorrectly construed at least one term in 37.5 percent of cases and that claim
construction errors required reversal or vacatur in 29.7 percent of cases); Schwartz, supra
note 5, at 248-49 (finding that, from 1996 through 2007, 29.7 percent of Federal Circuit
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reversal rates have declined in recent years,  de novo review still226
presents serious efficiency problems. Claim construction orders are
made relatively early in a case, often in conjunction with summary
judgment motions, and before any trial.  Yet the Federal Circuit227
typically will not review those orders until after a final judgment
issues.  In the interim, the district court may conduct a trial based228
on its initial claim construction. If the Federal Circuit eventually
reverses that construction, a remand for further factual develop-
ment—often a costly second trial—will be necessary.  229
Some data suggest that high Federal Circuit reversal rates are
not limited to claim construction,  although the empirical litera-230
ture does not unanimously support this view.  Regardless of these231
conflicting quantitative data, there is a widely shared perception
that Federal Circuit appeals are abnormally unpredictable, due in
significant part to de novo review of claim construction.  As a con-232
appeals involving claim construction issues were reversed, vacated, or remanded due to claim
construction errors, and that, in another 8.3 percent of cases, the Federal Circuit found a
claim construction error but still affirmed); see also Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at
the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1172-73 nn.46-47 & 51 (2010) (noting that
“Schwartz’s and Moore’s claim construction studies are the only ones to comprehensively
account for ... summary affirmances in calculating reversal rates” and also discussing overall
reversal rates for civil cases).
226. J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, From De Novo to Informal Deference: An
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of the Standard of Appellate Review for Patent
Claim Construction 53 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2,150,360, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150360 (finding that, since July 2005, a claim
construction error required reversal, vacatur, or remand in 24.1 percent of Federal Circuit
cases in which claim construction was at issue).
227. See Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment, and Judicial
Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 95-96 (2005).
228. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 396
n.381 (2012).
229. See ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, A SECTION WHITE PAPER: AGENDA
FOR 21ST CENTURY PATENT REFORM 33 (rev. Sept. 2010) (noting that frequent reversals on
claim construction “cause[ ] inefficiencies,” “waste[ ] judicial, litigant, and client resources,”
and “cause[ ] patent cases to cost substantially more to litigate, because a trial or portions of
the litigation must be relitigated”).
230. See, e.g., Field, supra note 14, at 759 (showing that the overall reversal rate in Federal
Circuit patent cases is 28.8 percent, compared with a 14 percent reversal rate in regional
circuit cases used as a control group).
231. See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 225, at 1194 (“[A]lthough claim construction reversal
rates seem unduly high, based on the best available evidence, the Federal Circuit’s reversal
rates in patent cases overall are roughly the same as or lower than reversal rates for complex
cases in other circuits.”).
232. Id. at 1184-85.
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sequence, litigants and judges have a cynical perception of patent
litigation generally and the Federal Circuit specifically. For ex-
ample, then-District Judge Kathleen O’Malley, now a judge on the
Federal Circuit, once joked that “litigants should want to be on the
losing side at the district court level because there appears to be a
presumption at the [Federal Circuit] that district judges generally
get claim construction wrong.”  Although Judge O’Malley recog-233
nized that her statement was not quite empirically accurate,  the234
sentiment captures the perception that the Federal Circuit holds
significant power over patent infringement determinations and
exercises it in somewhat arbitrary fashion. If patent appeals are no
more predictable than “throw[ing] darts,” as another district judge
has quipped,  the patent system suffers. District judges, viewing235
themselves as mere “[way] station[s] along the way to appeal”—
another sentiment expressed by a sitting district judge —might be236
less inclined to invest their scarce time into the case. 
Also, the Federal Circuit’s de novo review of claim construction
indirectly displaces district court authority in other areas of patent
law. Because claim construction reversals often nullify the district
court’s infringement analysis, there is what Arti Rai has called a
“domino effect”: rather than “remand for a new trial,” the Federal
Circuit may “simply declare[ ] that there is no factual dispute” on
the issue of infringement and decide the entire case itself.  Indeed,237
at least one Federal Circuit judge, when discussing claim construc-
tion, has acknowledged the court’s hesitancy to remand for a new
trial.  238
233. Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the
Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 680 (2004).
234. See id.
235. Anandashankar Mazumdar, Federal District Courts Need Experts That Are Good
“Teachers,” Judges Tell Bar, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 536, 536 (2005) (quoting
District Judge Marsha Pechman).
236. O’Malley et al., supra note 233, at 682 (comments of District Judge Patti Saris, stating
also that “the high reversal rate demoralizes many federal district court judges”).
237. See Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 884-85 (2002); accord William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil,
Essay, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit’s Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 740-45 (2000).
238. Alan D. Lourie, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Speech to the
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Section of the D.C. Bar (June 16, 2000), in 60 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 147 (2000) (“[W]hile in a particular case, one might consider that
a remand rather than a reversal is in order, we hesitate to send a case back to the district
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Of course, some important issues in patent cases are questions of
fact subject to more deferential appellate review, such as the ulti-
mate question of infringement, aspects of the analysis for nonobvi-
ousness, and the requirement that an invention be novel. Also,
declining reversal rates on claim construction could gradually shift
power to district courts through an opaque system of “informal
deference.”  Nevertheless, as long as claim construction doctrine239
provides for de novo review, the balance of power favors the Federal
Circuit. Claim construction is crucial to nearly every issue in a
patent case, “so judges and juries often have little discretion once a
particular construction has been accorded to a patent’s claims.”240
The power the Federal Circuit exercises over the fact-related
question of claim construction highlights yet another role played by
the Federal Circuit: fact-finding trial court. As in both the federal-
ism and separation of powers relationships, the court has justified
its changing roles based on a need for uniformity in patent law and
patent adjudication.241
2. Enhancing Power Through Procedure: The Federal Circuit as
a District Court
Besides uniformity, another reason Congress created the Federal
Circuit was to provide expert adjudication in complex patent
cases.  The court’s mission to provide expertise is useful in under-242
standing another role played by the Federal Circuit: that of a dis-
trict court. In particular, the Federal Circuit has recently opened
new avenues of interlocutory appeal that further shift power away
from federal trial courts. 
court when it is plain to us what the result will be. I believe most district judges would rather
have the case decided by us rather than for us to be too finicky about reversing and send the
case back for another trial.”).
239. Anderson & Menell, supra note 226, at 9 (arguing that the Federal Circuit should
formally recognize a more deferential standard of appellate review to improve the quality and
transparency of claim construction analysis). The notion of informal deference has appeared
in some recent Federal Circuit opinions. For example, in a pair of decisions written by Chief
Judge Paul Michel shortly before his retirement, the court stated that, even under a de novo
standard of review, “common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight.” Dow
Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Randall May Int’l, Inc.
v. DEG Music Prods., Inc., 378 F. App’x 989, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same).
240. Fromer, supra note 3, at 1461.
241. See supra notes 83, 104, 109, 155 and accompanying text.
242. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981).
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The writ of mandamus is a mechanism to obtain immediate
appellate review of an order that does not end the district court
proceedings. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ and will issue only
if the district court’s error was “clear and indisputable” and the
petitioner has no other means to seek adequate relief.  In the243
Federal Circuit’s early days, the court viewed its lack of “supervi-
sory authority”  as an additional limit on its ability to issue man-244
damus. The court would issue the writ only on matters that “directly
implicate[d]” or were “intimately bound up with and controlled by”
patent law.  In other words, the court would not review nonpatent245
issues on mandamus, even though it would review those same
issues on a postjudgment appeal. 
Without explicitly overruling this older case law, the court has
granted mandamus on many nonpatent issues, such as attorney-
client privilege  and transfer of venue.  The court’s willingness to246 247
consider mandamus petitions on these issues is to some extent a
positive development because it affords Federal Circuit litigants the
same opportunities for appeal as litigants in the regional circuits.
Yet interlocutory appeals can be disruptive, injecting an appeal at
an early stage on issues that might become moot.  For example,248
suppose a district court erroneously denies a defendant’s motion to
transfer venue. If the defendant ultimately wins the case on sum-
mary judgment or after trial, that error would be harmless. And so,
before December 2008, the Federal Circuit had never granted
mandamus to reverse a lower court’s transfer decision, denying at
least twenty-two petitions on the issue since 1982.  But, since that249
time, the court has issued mandamus on transfer eleven times.  250
243. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004). 
244. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
245. In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
246. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
247. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
248. See GREGORY A. CASTANIAS & ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 65-66 (2008).
249. Gugliuzza, supra note 228, at 346.
250. See id. at 346 nn.8 & 10 (citing cases). Since December 2008, the court has by my
count denied twenty-five petitions challenging venue decisions. See id. at 346 nn.9-10 (citing
cases); see also In re EMC Corp., Misc. No. 142, 2013 WL 324154 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2013)
(denying petitions seeking transfer of multiple cases from the Eastern District of Texas to
other districts); In re Fusion-IO, Inc., Misc. No. 139, 2012 WL 6634939 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21,
2012) (denying petition seeking transfer from the Eastern District of Texas to the District of
Utah); In re Princeton Digital Image Corp., Misc. No. 136, 2012 WL 5899325 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
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Initially, those orders were all directed at one court, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, and the orders all
applied the law of the Fifth Circuit, which permits relatively liberal
use of mandamus to review transfer decisions.  Thus, one might251
argue that the Federal Circuit’s decisions were an acceptable re-
sponse to a peculiar problem with one court’s transfer practice.252
But to grant mandamus over and over on the same issue decided by
the same court is unprecedented in any court of appeals, even the
Fifth Circuit.  253
Frequent grants of mandamus offer yet another example of
Federal Circuit exceptionalism and invite questions about why the
court would take such aggressive action against the Eastern
District. The Eastern District has a reputation for favoring patent
holders and is an attractive destination for forum-shopping plain-
tiffs.  The Federal Circuit could simply be displeased with the254
court’s pro-patent slant and be using a procedural mechanism to
achieve substantive ends. That said, although patent holders do fare
relatively well in the Eastern District,  if the court were unduly255
26, 2012) (denying petition seeking to overturn a district court decision transferring the case
from the Eastern District of Texas to the Southern District of New York); In re HTC Corp.,
Misc. No. 130, 2012 WL 4198258 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2012) (denying petition seeking transfer
from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District of California); In re Capital One
Fin. Corp., 475 F. App’x 337 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (denying petition seeking transfer
from the Eastern District of Texas to the Southern District of Texas); In re Vicor Corp., Misc.
No. 120, 2012 WL 3235199 (Fed. Cir. July 26, 2012) (denying petition seeking transfer from
the Eastern District of Texas to the District of Massachusetts); In re Altera Corp., Misc. No.
121, 2012 WL 2951522 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2012) (per curiam) (denying petition seeking
transfer from the District of Delaware to the Northern District of California).
251. See Danny S. Ashby et al., The Increasing Use and Importance of Mandamus in the
Fifth Circuit, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2011).
252. See Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9
YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 216 (2007) (arguing that the Eastern District is unduly reluctant to
order transfer). But see Paul M. Janicke, Patent Venue and Convenience Transfer: New World
or Small Shift?, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 19-23 (2009), http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/
default/files/Janicke.pdf (finding that the Eastern District transfers roughly the same
percentage of its patent cases as other district courts).
253. Gugliuzza, supra note 228, at 347. Some circuits refuse to even consider discretionary
transfer decisions on mandamus, reasoning that increased interlocutory review might cause
excessive delay. See 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 65, § 3855. 
254. See Li Zhu, Note, Taking Off: Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation
in the Rocket Docket, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 901, 902 (2010).
255. Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent
Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 318 (2011) (showing
2013] THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AS A FEDERAL COURT 1839
biased in favor of plaintiffs, one might expect frequent appellate
reversals on the merits. Yet the Federal Circuit appears to reverse
the Eastern District at about the same rate as it reverses other
district courts.  256
Another way of viewing the Federal Circuit’s increased interlocu-
tory review is to consider that the Eastern District, because of its
heavy load of patent cases,  might be considered an “expert” tri-257
bunal at the trial level. The court was one of the first districts to
adopt special local rules for patent cases,  and it has a reputation258
for processing patent cases relatively quickly.  But Congress259
created the Federal Circuit to provide an expert patent tribunal,260
even if the factual complexity of patent cases suggests that expertise
might be more useful at the trial level.  By transferring decisions261
out of the Eastern District, the Federal Circuit retains its status as
the only expert patent court. Indeed, in a recent State of the Court
address, the Federal Circuit’s chief judge expressed concern that
patent litigation is becoming too concentrated in a small number of
venues.262
that plaintiffs in the Eastern District win 43 percent of contested cases, compared with win-
rates ranging from 18 percent to 42.9 percent in ten other popular districts for patent cases).
256. See id. at 307 (calculating that the Federal Circuit affirms in full 61 percent of
decisions from the Eastern District, compared with a national average affirmance-in-full rate
that has ranged between 47 percent and 60 percent over the past ten years); see also Anderson
& Menell, supra note 226, at 97 (showing that the Eastern District had the lowest reversal
rate on the issue of claim construction among twelve of the most active patent districts from
2000 through 2010).
257. In 2011, the court received more patent case filings than any other district. THOMAS
F. HOGAN, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 162 tbl.C-7 (2011).
258. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449,
476-77 (2010).
259. This reputation may not be entirely deserved. See Lemley, supra note 43, at 415-19
(noting, in a study of thirty-three district courts that resolved more than twenty-five patent
cases from 2000 to 2010, that the Eastern District ranked seventh in time to trial but twenty-
eighth in time to resolution).
260. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981).
261. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent
Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 444 (2011) (presenting an empirical analysis that
“provides a real but modest case for ... the establishment of a specialized patent trial court”).
262. Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Speech at
the Fifteenth Annual Eastern District of Texas Bench and Bar Conference: The State of
Patent Litigation (Sept. 27, 2011), in 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 341 (2012) (“The Northern District
of California, the District of Delaware, or the Eastern District of Texas should not be chosen
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Regardless of the court’s motive, this expansion of interlocutory
review may have serious consequences for the judiciary. For one, the
court’s willingness to grant mandamus has increased the number of
petitions filed, which can delay proceedings in trial courts. From
2005 through 2009, the Federal Circuit received, on average,
twenty-eight petitions for extraordinary relief each year.  The263
court granted its first transfer petition in December 2008, and, in
the past two years, it has received about forty-five petitions per
year.  Also, when the court grants petitions, as is increasingly the264
case, adjudication of the matter is significantly delayed because the
cases must essentially start anew in the transferee district.265
Finally, the delay and costs that stem from interlocutory review
may be multiplied as the Federal Circuit, relying on its transfer
precedent in cases from the Eastern District of Texas, finds man-
damus to be an appropriate means of reviewing other types of
interlocutory orders and interlocutory orders from other courts. For
example, in 2011, the court for the first time ordered a court besides
the Eastern District of Texas to transfer a patent dispute.  In266
another recent case, the court held as “a matter of first impression”
that mandamus could be used to review a district court decision on
joinder.  267
None of this is to say that the Federal Circuit’s transfer analysis
has been consistently incorrect, as the Eastern District’s connection
to many cases filed there is relatively weak.  Nor is it to say that268
joinder is not a troublesome issue in patent litigation.  It is simply269
interesting that the Federal Circuit has chosen to combat these
problems—both of which Congress has expressed interest in
by default or for attorney convenience .... [T]he best way for us to strengthen our judicial
system is to share and promote other venues.”).
263. See Statistics: Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
264. Id.
265. This assertion is based on my conversations with lawyers involved in cases transferred
out of the Eastern District of Texas.
266. See In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (ordering transfer from the District of Delaware to the Northern District of
California).
267. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
268. See Gugliuzza, supra note 228, at 383-90.
269. See David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 6-7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957803 (describing split among
district courts regarding the proper standard for joinder).
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addressing —by effectively acting as a district court, aggressively270
reviewing decisions normally left to the discretion of the trial judge.
By expanding appellate power, the court might further undermine
the efficiency of a litigation system that many already view as
rather inefficient. 
B. The Federal Circuit and the ITC
The Federal Circuit has also aggressively reviewed the ITC, the
other trial-level tribunal that hears patent cases. The ITC is an
independent agency that can prohibit importation of goods that
infringe U.S. patents.  Although the ITC has had the power to271
issue exclusion orders since its inception in 1975,  its jurisdiction272
over patent cases has become increasingly important in recent
years, partly because the Supreme Court has limited patentees’ abil-
ity to obtain district court injunctions against infringement.  The273
Federal Circuit has held that these limitations do not apply to the
ITC,  and the number of ITC investigations into patent infringe-274
ment has grown, from about twelve per year in the 1990s, to twenty-
two per year from 2000 to 2005, to forty-four per year from 2006 to
the present.  Given this extensive and growing experience with275
270. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(d), 125 Stat. 284, 332-
33 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299(b)) (prohibiting joinder when based solely on the
allegation that the defendants infringed the same patent); S. 515, 111th Cong. § 8 (2009)
(limiting venue for patent cases to districts such as the defendant’s principal place of business,
place of incorporation, or the place of infringement if the defendant has substantial operations
there). 
271. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2006).
272. See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases
at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 73 (2008); see also Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 171-172, 88 Stat. 2009, 2009-10 (forming the ITC from the
former U.S. Tariff Commission).
273. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390-91 (2006) (overturning the
Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that a patentee who prevailed in a district court on a claim
of infringement was automatically entitled to an injunction prohibiting sales of the infringing
product). Since eBay, district courts have granted about 75 percent of requests for injunctions,
down from 95 percent before eBay. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the
ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2012).
274. Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
275. Number of Section 337 Investigations Instituted by Calendar Year, U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/cy_337_institutions.pdf
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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patent litigation, the ITC’s administrative law judges are generally
regarded as expert patent adjudicators.276
Yet preliminary evidence suggests that the Federal Circuit is
reluctant to empower the ITC. For instance, the Federal Circuit has
not given Chevron or Skidmore deference to ITC decisions on patent
validity, enforceability, or claim construction.  Moreover, the277
Federal Circuit reviews ITC claim construction de novo, and the
court reverses ITC claim construction decisions at about the same
high rates it reverses claim constructions of district courts with sig-
nificant patent dockets.  Because the ITC can issue exclusion278
orders but cannot award damages, most ITC petitioners also sue in
district court. But the Federal Circuit does not treat ITC determina-
tions as preclusive in subsequent litigation. This leaves the court
free to ignore, for example, an ITC decision finding infringement
when it is faced with a district court appeal on the same issue.  279
If these trends hold, the ITC will have a minimal role in shaping
patent law and policy, just like the PTO and district courts with
patent-heavy dockets. The Federal Circuit will remain the sole
patent expert in the federal system.
V. THE HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIP: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND
THE REGIONAL CIRCUITS
The final piece in the taxonomy of Federal Circuit relationships
is the court’s horizontal relationship with the regional circuits. One
way in which the Federal Circuit interacts with the regional circuits
is in determining whether an appeal from a federal district court
“aris[es] under” patent law, conferring exclusive appellate jurisdic-
tion on the Federal Circuit, as opposed to the regional circuits.  As280
discussed above, in the federalism relationship, the Federal Circuit
had adopted an expansive view of which state-law claims arise
276. David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702-03 (2009).
277. Kumar, supra note 3, at 1568 & n.112.
278. Schwartz, supra note 276, at 1719-20 (noting that, because of differences between ITC
investigations and district court litigation, “comparing reversal rates ... must be done with
caution”).
279. See Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). 
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under patent law, upholding federal jurisdiction any time the case
required an analysis of patent infringement or validity.  The281
Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn, which restricted the class of
cases that arise under patent law, will therefore also narrow the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis the regional circuits.282
Another way the Federal Circuit interacts with the regional cir-
cuits is through choice-of-law rules. These rules provide a final illus-
tration of the Federal Circuit’s changing roles, with the court acting
like a regional circuit by increasingly applying its own law to all
federal issues that arise on appeal, rather than limiting Federal
Circuit law to patent issues. The court has expanded the reach of its
own law both explicitly, by altering its choice-of-law rules, and
implicitly, by treating Federal Circuit case law as binding even if
regional circuit law controls the relevant issue. 
A. Explicitly Expanding the Reach of Federal Circuit Law
Shortly after Congress created the Federal Circuit, the court es-
tablished that it would apply its own law to questions of substantive
patent law, procedural issues unique to patent law, and questions
of its own jurisdiction.  The court would apply the law of the rele-283
vant regional circuit to all other questions.  Commentators thus284
characterized the Federal Circuit’s approach to choice of law as
“cautious”; early cases suggested that the Federal Circuit would
281. See supra Part II.B.
282. As a factual matter, jurisdictional disputes implicating the horizontal relationship
differ from cases implicating the federalism relationship. In the horizontal cases, there
usually will be no dispute that federal jurisdiction existed at the trial level, likely because the
case included a claim created by federal law or because the parties were of diverse citizenship.
On appeal, however, the precise statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction may become
an issue because, if the case contains a claim arising under patent law, appellate jurisdiction
is exclusive in the Federal Circuit. In Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of
Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007), for instance, the district court granted the
plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment that a statute adopted by the District of
Columbia was preempted by the federal patent laws and unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. There was apparently no dispute over subject matter jurisdiction in the
district court because of the obviously federal nature of the plaintiffs’ claims. See id. On
appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit transferred the case to the Federal Circuit, and the Federal
Circuit accepted jurisdiction, reasoning that the preemption claim arose under patent law
because patent law was a necessary element of the plaintiffs’ claim. See id. at 1367.
283. See Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking
Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1181 (1996).
284. Id. at 1181-82.
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defer to regional circuit law on many nonpatent issues.  Yet the285
court gradually expanded the category of procedural issues “unique”
to patent law, applying its own law to the due process component of
personal jurisdiction,  the standard for injunctive relief,  stan-286 287
ding,  and the meaning of “prevailing party” under the Federal288
Rules of Civil Procedure.289
The court expanded the reach of its law on procedural matters
most significantly in the en banc portion of its opinion in Midwest
Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc.  The issue in that case290
was whether the plaintiff ’s Lanham Act and state-law trademark
claims were preempted by federal patent law.  The court held291
that Federal Circuit law governed the preemption analysis, over-
ruling earlier decisions that had applied regional circuit law.292
Significantly broadening the applicability of its own law to proce-
dural issues, the court noted that Federal Circuit law would control
(1) “if the issue pertain[s] to patent law,” (2) if the issue “bears
an essential relationship to matters committed to [the Federal
Circuit’s] exclusive control by statute,” or (3) if the issue “clearly
implicates the jurisprudential responsibilities of [the] court in a field
within its exclusive jurisdiction.”  The court again justified its293
expansion of authority with an appeal to its “obligation of promoting
uniformity in the field of patent law.”  The court has since de-294
ployed the Midwest Industries framework to apply Federal Circuit
law to determine whether patent-related Lanham Act and state-law
unfair competition claims are preempted by federal antitrust law,295
and to additional transsubstantive issues, such as the attorney-
client privilege  and the standards for joinder under the Federal296
285. See Scott A. Stempel & John F. Terzaken III, Casting a Long IP Shadow over Antitrust
Jurisprudence: The Federal Circuit’s Expanding Jurisdictional Reach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 711,
726 (2001).
286. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
287. Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
288. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 954 & n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
289. Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
290. 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in relevant part).
291. Id. at 1357.
292. Id. at 1358-59 (citing cases).
293. Id. at 1359 (internal quotation marks omitted).
294. Id. at 1360.
295. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
296. In re Spaulding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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Rules of Civil Procedure.  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit still297
usually applies regional circuit law to many important procedural
issues, such as the standards for motions to dismiss and motions for
judgment as a matter of law.298
The Federal Circuit has also expanded the reach of its law in
nonpatent substantive areas, such as antitrust law.  Initially, the299
court applied regional circuit law to patent-related antitrust claims,
such as claims that a patent holder filed an infringement suit in bad
faith.  In Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., however,300
the court overruled this older precedent, holding that antitrust suits
involving “conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent” would be
governed by Federal Circuit law.  To justify this expansion of301
Federal Circuit authority, the court again appealed to uniformity,
reasoning that applying its own law would “avoid the ‘danger of
confusion [that] might be enhanced if this court were to embark on
an effort to interpret the laws’ of the regional circuits.”  Since302
Nobelpharma, the court has applied Federal Circuit antitrust law
to additional matters such as tying  and refusals to deal  in-303 304
volving patented products. Again, however, the extension of Federal
Circuit law is incomplete, as the court applies regional circuit law
to nonpatent aspects of antitrust claims, such as market definition
and market power.305
Federal courts of appeals are usually not bound by other circuits’
law,  and good reasons exist for criticizing the Federal Circuit’s306
choice-of-law doctrine. Most notably, it is not easy to predict where
the court will draw the line between patent and nonpatent mat-
297. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
298. See Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for
Procedural Matters in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 644-49 (2009) (noting
inconsistency in the court’s approach to choice of law on these issues).
299. See James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay of Patent Rights and Antitrust
Restraints in the Federal Circuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137, 141-42 (2001).
300. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
301. 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant part).
302. Id. (quoting Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
303. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated
on other grounds, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
304. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
305. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
306. See Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 38 n.219.
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ters.  The court has inconsistently articulated its choice-of-law307
rules and has applied different bodies of law to the same issue in
different cases.  Attorney-client privilege, for instance, is some-308
times governed by Federal Circuit law and sometimes by regional
circuit law.  Moreover, when the regional circuit has not decided309
an issue governed by regional circuit law, the Federal Circuit takes
the anomalous step of predicting how the regional circuit would rule
rather than declaring the content of federal law.  310
A more efficient approach might be for Federal Circuit law to
apply to all matters in cases that arise under patent law.  This311
approach would eliminate litigation over which circuit’s law applies
and potentially enhance predictability. Also, to the extent that
Federal Circuit law suffers from a lack of percolation,  extending312
Federal Circuit law to more nonpatent issues would require the
court to regularly engage issues on which there are rich bodies of
regional circuit law.  Moreover, as discussed below, the current313
choice-of-law rules can lead to the strange result that a long line of
Federal Circuit decisions on a particular issue are not actually
binding authority because regional circuit law governs the issue.314
That said, applying Federal Circuit law to all issues in a patent
case could complicate matters for district judges, who would be
forced to interpret and apply even more Federal Circuit nonpatent
law. The Federal Circuit, however, has not been shy about expand-
ing its power over other institutions, such as state courts,  district315
307. See Kimberly A. Moore, Essay, Juries, Patent Cases, and a Lack of Transparency, 39
HOUS. L. REV. 779, 800-01 (2002).
308. See Field, supra note 298, at 644-45. 
309. Compare In re Spaulding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(applying Federal Circuit law when the allegedly privileged document “relate[d] to an
invention ... consider[ed] for possible patent protection”), with Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup
Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying regional circuit law in determining
whether waiver of privilege extended to communications concerning the on-sale bar of the
Patent Act).
310. E.g., Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, 684 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
311. See Field, supra note 298, at 646 (arguing that “in patent cases, the Federal Circuit
should apply its own law to all procedural issues, regardless of whether these issues are
related to substantive patent law”).
312. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 3, at 661-62.
313. See Dreyfuss, supra note 41, at 59.
314. See infra Part V.B.
315. See supra Part II.B.
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courts,  and the PTO.  One might, therefore, ask why the Federal316 317
Circuit has been more restrained in the horizontal relationship.
That is, why has the Federal Circuit not simply applied its own law
to all issues in patent cases? 
One reason might be that, under the current choice-of-law regime,
the court retains the ability to define or redefine on an ad hoc basis
which matters are controlled by Federal Circuit law. So, there might
be no need to further alter basic choice-of-law principles. The court
can, for example, continue to apply regional circuit law to proce-
dural matters—many of which, such as standards for dispositive
motions, are uniform among the circuits anyway—but define issues
as controlled by Federal Circuit law if the court disagrees with the
law of the relevant regional circuit.  Additionally, the Federal318
Circuit might be more cautious in the choice-of-law context because
it is competing for power with formidable opponents: the regional
circuits. If the Federal Circuit improperly attempted to supplant
regional circuit law, a regional circuit might be more apt than, say,
a district court, to criticize the Federal Circuit in a subsequent
case.  Finally, to apply Federal Circuit law to all issues in patent319
cases would require a dramatic legal change. The court would be
forced to overrule three decades of precedent that is relevant to
every appeal of patent litigation. Compared to other circuits, the
Federal Circuit is a leader in convening en banc to change its law.320
But it would take a tremendous institutional commitment to over-
rule one of the foundational aspects of Federal Circuit practice. 
316. See supra Part IV.A.
317. See supra Part III.A.
318. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (applying Federal Circuit law rather than Tenth Circuit law to a trade dress issue,
noting that the Tenth Circuit’s approach “stands alone” among the circuits). The Federal
Circuit’s recent decision in Revision Military, Inc. v. Balboa Manufacturing Co., 700 F.3d 524
(Fed. Cir. 2012), also illustrates how the court can potentially leverage choice-of-law rules to
dictate case outcomes. In that case, the Federal Circuit vacated a district court decision that
had denied a preliminary injunction against patent infringement because the district court
had applied the Second Circuit’s standard for preliminary injunctions, not the Federal
Circuit’s standard. Id. at 525. Second Circuit law requires that the plaintiff show a “‘clear’ or
‘substantial’ likelihood of success on the merits” when the plaintiff “seeks ‘an injunction that
will alter rather than maintain the status quo,’” whereas Federal Circuit law requires the
plaintiff to show only that success on the merits is “more likely than not.” Id. at 525-26. 
319. Cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1056-57 (7th Cir.
1986) (criticizing a Federal Circuit jurisdictional ruling as “clearly wrong”).
320. See Vacca, supra note 166, at 736-44.
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Whatever the reason for the Federal Circuit’s restraint in the
horizontal relationship, viewed as a whole, the court’s choice-of-law
doctrine still fits a pattern of expanding Federal Circuit power
justified by the policy aim of ensuring uniformity in patent law. 
B. Implicitly Expanding the Reach of Federal Circuit Law
While the Federal Circuit has expanded its power over the
regional circuits explicitly by increasing the number of issues
governed by its own law, the court has also expanded its reach
implicitly. In some cases, the court has acknowledged that, under
governing choice-of-law principles, it is bound to apply regional
circuit law, yet the court has relied upon its own case law to develop
a Federal Circuit-specific line of authority. 
The transfer of venue cases discussed above  are examples of321
this phenomenon. Transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is a
nonpatent procedural issue governed by regional circuit law.  The322
court began its mandamus revolution by relying on an en banc Fifth
Circuit decision that had granted mandamus to order the Eastern
District of Texas to transfer a tort case to the Northern District of
Texas.  323
Over the past four years, however, the Federal Circuit has begun
to rely more heavily on its own growing body of § 1404(a) case law.
For example, in In re Morgan Stanley, the court ordered transfer
from the Eastern District of Texas to the Southern District of New
York.  The court pointed out that the plaintiff and most of the324
defendants were “headquartered in or close by the transferee
venue,” similar to a prior decision in which the Federal Circuit
granted transfer when the plaintiff and many defendants were
headquartered in the transferee venue.  The court also rejected the325
plaintiff’s argument that, because the patents-in-suit had been
asserted in a prior case in the Eastern District, judicial economy
favored denial of transfer.  The court analogized to two of its prior326
321. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
322. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1222-23 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
323. See In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319-22 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
324. 417 F. App’x 947, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
325. Id. (citing In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
326. See id. at 949. 
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mandamus decisions, which it read to hold that “the proper admin-
istration of justice may be to transfer to the far more convenient
venue even when the trial court has some familiarity with a matter
from prior litigation.”327
In a later case, In re Biosearch Technologies, Inc., the court
conceded that its prior mandamus decisions were only “persuasive
authority for transfer.”  Nevertheless, it emphasized that “[i]n328
analogous situations ... we have determined that the asserted geo-
graphical centrality of Texas did not outweigh” the inconvenience to
the defendant and ordered transfer.  These decisions and others329 330
illustrate how the Federal Circuit can, in practice, ignore its choice-
of-law principles to expand the reach of its authority. 
Again, however, the Federal Circuit’s expansion of power through
choice of law has been less aggressive than in its other relation-
ships. The court has expanded its law to cover some, but not all,
patent issues, and some of the expansion has occurred implicitly,
rather than through explicit alteration of doctrine. This less aggres-
sive approach is interesting in the horizontal relationship because,
as discussed above,  patent litigation might benefit from the331
Federal Circuit applying its own law to more nonpatent issues, like
transfer of venue. Clearer choice-of-law rules could eliminate liti-
gation over which circuit’s law applies, and binding, patent-specific
procedural precedent could provide useful guidance to litigants and
lower courts. In any event, by expanding the reach of its own law,
the court can be viewed as shifting into yet another role—that of a
327. Id. (citing In re Verizon Bus. Network Servs. Inc., 635 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re
Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
328. 452 F. App’x 986, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
329. Id. at 988-89 (citing In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
330. See, e.g., In re EMC Corp., Misc. No. 142, 2013 WL 324154, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29,
2013) (denying transfer, noting that “we have held that a district court’s experience with a
patent in prior litigation and the copendency of cases involving the same patent are
permissible considerations in ruling on a motion to transfer venue” and that “[t]he latter
consideration is applicable here” because denial of transfer would permit the same judge to
handle multiple suits by the plaintiff “involving the same patents and technology” (citation
omitted) (citing In re Vistaprint, Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2010))); In re
Apple Inc., 456 F. App’x 907, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying transfer and noting that,
“measured against [prior Federal Circuit cases], there [was] a plausible argument that” the
party seeking transfer “did not meet its burden of demonstrating ... that the transferee venue
[was] ‘clearly more convenient’”). 
331. See supra notes 306-14 and accompanying text.
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regional circuit—which will usually apply its own law to any federal
issue that comes before it.
VI. POWER EXPANSION: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
This taxonomy of relationships illustrates that, in various ways,
for various reasons, and to various degrees, the Federal Circuit has
preserved and expanded its own power relative to other government
bodies. These power dynamics provide a glimpse into the “black
hole” of judicial behavior,  in the unique context of a specialized332
court.  These dynamics also highlight important issues for future333
inquiry, such as how power expansion in Federal Circuit patent law
impacts the court’s nonpatent litigants.
A. Into the Black Hole: Judicial Behavior on a Specialized Court
Scholars have theorized that specialized courts inherently tend to
expand their power.  The discussion above provides qualitative334
support for that argument, yet it also raises questions about why
this power expansion occurs. In the Federal Circuit’s case, many
complex and nuanced influences appear to be at work, such as the
court’s institutional identities as unifier of patent law and expert
patent tribunal. In addition, other less obvious factors, including
judicial concerns about prestige, popularity, and institutional pre-
servation, might be relevant.
This discussion is intended to stimulate a conversation about how
specialized appellate courts—and in particular, the Federal Circuit
—make decisions in cases in which existing doctrine provides no
required answer. Scholars have, of course, developed many theories
332. Cf. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that, by interpreting patent claims with no deference to the district court,
the Federal Circuit has “substitut[ed] ... a black box, as it so pejoratively has been said of the
jury, with the black hole of this court”). 
333. For ease of reading, this discussion uses the term “specialized” to refer to any court,
such as the Federal Circuit, whose jurisdiction is defined by case subject matter, rather than
geography. Technically, the Federal Circuit is a semispecialized court because of its juris-
diction over numerous subject areas, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 245 (1996),
and this discussion, particularly in Part VI.B, also consider how the court’s semispecialized
nature might affect judicial behavior. 
334. See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 7, at 54; Aronson, supra note 7, at 259; Oldfather, supra
note 7, at 877; see also supra note 7.
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of judicial decision making.  Although the analysis below draws335
frequently on public choice considerations, it is not intended to be
situated within any particular theory. Rather, it aims to highlight
various factors that might be uniquely relevant on a specialized
court. 
Institutional Identity. Scholars have suggested that specialized
courts, because they are created to achieve a particular goal, might
seek to carry out a “mission” in ways that a generalist court would
not.  For example, Congress gave the Federal Circuit a dual mis-336
sion of providing uniformity in patent law and expertise in patent
cases.  The court has invoked uniformity to justify jurisdiction over337
state-law claims,  to refuse deference to inferior tribunals,  and338 339
to expand the reach of Federal Circuit law.  At least two of these340
three moves strain to find analogues in the regional circuits. The
regional circuits had generally rejected federal jurisdiction over
claims requiring only application of federal law,  a position that341
was embraced by the Supreme Court when it rejected the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdictional case law in Gunn v. Minton.  Also, accord-342
ing to some commentators, the regional circuits reverse district
courts at a lower rate than the Federal Circuit does in patent
cases.  343
335. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19-56 (2008) (outlining nine theories of
judicial behavior).
336. See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 7, at 39-40.
337. Supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285-86
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Congress’ intent to remove non-uniformity in the patent law, as evidenced
by its enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, is further indicium that
§ 1338 jurisdiction is proper [over state-law malpractice claims].” (citation omitted)); see also
supra Part II.B.
339. See, e.g., In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that review of PTO
fact-finding under a clear error standard, rather than the APA standards, “promote[s]
consistency between our review of the patentability decisions of the [PTO] and the district
courts in infringement litigation”), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); see
also supra Parts III.A, IV.A.1.
340. See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc in relevant part) (concluding that patent-related antitrust issues should be
governed by Federal Circuit law “because we are in the best position to create a uniform body
of federal law on this subject”); see also supra Part V.A.
341. See supra note 129.
342. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
343. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
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How expertise shapes Federal Circuit doctrine is less clear, but
a reasonable argument exists that the doctrine prevents other
institutions—such as the PTO, district courts with heavy dockets of
patent cases, and the ITC—from becoming loci of patent-law
expertise.  Perhaps providing a counterweight to this consolidation344
of expertise in the Federal Circuit, Congress has recently shown
interest in creating trial-court expertise, enacting a pilot program
that will allow certain district judges to elect or refuse to hear
patent cases.  345
The distorting effect of the Federal Circuit’s institutional identity
is compounded as other courts, deferring to the expert court, sur-
render power in the name of uniformity and perpetuate exception-
alist doctrines created by the Federal Circuit. For example, in a
trademark malpractice case decided in 2008, the Fifth Circuit had
expressly “decline[d] to follow” the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional
case law, which at the time extended federal “arising under” juris-
diction to state-law claims that required mere application of federal
patent law.  However, in a subsequent patent-related tort case also346
decided before Gunn, the Fifth Circuit refused to follow its own
precedent, instead following the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Air
Measurement and Immunocept because of “the strong federal in-
terest in the removal [of] non-uniformity in patent law.  Also,347
before Gunn, numerous state courts had relied upon those same
Federal Circuit decisions to relinquish state-court jurisdictions, with
many of the courts citing the policy of uniformity in patent law and
the expertise of federal courts, such as the Federal Circuit.  348
344. See supra Parts III.A, IV (discussing how the Federal Circuit has expanded its
authority at the expense of these other entities’ authority).
345. See Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674
(2011).
346. Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Immunocept,
LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Air Measurement
Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
347. USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2011) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
348. E.g., Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, 107 Cal. App. 3d 373,
374, 378-79 (2010); TattleTale Portable Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P.,
No. 08AP-693, 2009 WL 790314, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2009); see also In re Haynes
& Boone, LLP, No. 01-12-00341-CV, 2012 WL 3068787, at *6, *9 (Tex. App. July 26, 2012)
(Brown, J., concurring) (rejecting exclusive federal jurisdiction over an antitrust-related
malpractice claim, noting that “antitrust law does not present the same heightened need for
uniformity and predictability presented by questions of patent validity”); Minton v. Gunn, 355
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Prestige of the Institution. Another important factor in explaining
the Federal Circuit’s power enhancement could be the reputation or
prestige of the court as an institution. Public choice discussions of
prestige often focus on the notoriety of individual judges.  But349
judges on a specialized court, because of their narrow jurisdiction,
may have difficulty increasing their individual fame in the legal
community at large. A specialized court might, however, have a
unique ability to enhance its prestige as an institution. 
A specialized court could enhance its prestige in two ways. First,
it could formulate rules that enhance the social importance of the
law within its domain. There seems to be little dispute that patent
law is more important now than before Congress created the
Federal Circuit, if importance is judged by the size of the patent bar,
expenditures on patent protection and litigation, and public aware-
ness of the field.  To be clear, this correlation does not neces-350
sarily indicate causation; other variables, such as general economic
growth, likely explain some of the growth of the patent system. But
one might reasonably attribute the increased importance of patent
law at least partially to the Federal Circuit, particularly because the
court has, according to most commentators, relaxed the require-
ments to obtain a patent.  It would be harder for an individual351
regional circuit to increase the importance of any area of law be-
cause few areas are within any regional circuit’s exclusive jurisdic-
tion.  352
S.W.3d 634, 646 (Tex. 2011) (declining jurisdiction over a patent-related malpractice case,
noting the “interest in the uniform application of patent law by courts well-versed in that
subject matter”), rev’d, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
349. See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of
Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 838 (“[A]mbitious judges could seek to maximize
their ‘influence’ and ‘prestige,’ which are normally achieved by excellence in argument and
writing.”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13-14 (1993) (noting that “prestige is
unquestionably an element of the judicial utility function” but that “[a]part from opposing an
increase in the number of judges or a dilution of the title ‘judge,’ there is little an individual
can do to enhance his prestige as a judge”).
350. See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
207, 224-30 (2006). 
351. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 28, at 110-25; cf. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 50,
at 352 (linking the creation of the Federal Circuit to increased activity in the field of patent
law).
352. Harder, but not impossible, because certain circuits hear a large percentage of the
appeals in particular areas of law. For example, in the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit increased its
profile by battling with the Supreme Court over matters of agency procedure. See Susan Low
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The second way in which a specialized court might enhance its
prestige is by increasing the institution’s importance to the law it
administers. The Federal Circuit has arguably done this by solid-
ifying its position as the only expert patent institution. In the sep-
aration of powers relationship, for instance, the court has curtailed
the PTO’s ability to shape substantive patent law.  Similarly, in353
the vertical relationship, the court has used mandamus to direct
many patent cases out of the Eastern District of Texas and has
minimized its deference to the ITC, both of which might be thought
of as “expert” trial forums due to their significant dockets of patent
cases.  A regional circuit, which lacks exclusive jurisdiction, would354
find it more difficult to increase its own importance to a particular
area of law.  355
Popularity. Discussion of judicial and institutional reputation
leads to another factor that Judge Richard Posner has identified as
relevant to judicial decision making generally: popularity with the
bar.  This effect may be exacerbated in a specialized court whose356
Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the
District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 576-77 (2002). Given the D.C. Circuit’s semispecialized
administrative law docket, one might view this enhancement of the importance of
administrative law as a parallel to the Federal Circuit’s potential enhancement of the
importance of patent law, although the D.C. Circuit’s administrative law cases often have
more political salience than most patent cases. See generally John M. Golden, The Federal
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 553 (2010) (chronicling and analyzing battles between the Supreme Court and
both the D.C. and Federal Circuits). 
353. See supra Part III.A.
354. See supra Part IV.
355. Again, harder, but not impossible. Certain types of cases cluster in certain regional
circuits, but the causes of this clustering are often beyond the judges’ control. For example,
the Second Circuit’s Manhattan location contributes to its high-profile docket of business
litigation. Also, many of the D.C. Circuit’s administrative law cases are directed by specific
jurisdictional provisions or by federal agencies that prefer to litigate in Washington. See
Patricia Wald et al., The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN.
L. REV. 507, 510-11 (1988). That said, one might argue that the prominence of the Seventh
Circuit in a variety of areas—antitrust perhaps most notably—is fueled largely by the work
of judges like Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, and similar arguments could be made
about certain D.C. Circuit judges and administrative law.
356. Posner, supra note 349, at 13; see also Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and
the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629 (2000) (“Perhaps
the Justices of the Supreme Court, like the rest of us, care about their reputation, care about
the esteem in which they are held by certain reference groups, and care enough such that, at
the margin or even far from the margin, they seek to conform their behavior to the demands
of the relevant esteem-granting (or withholding) or reputation-creating (or damaging)
groups.”).
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work is relevant only to one or a small number of components of the
bar.  Moreover, the judges of the court will likely be drawn from357
that group. Specialized judges might therefore favor legal rules that
please its specialized bar.  358
As noted, the creation of the Federal Circuit coincides with
increased legal activity in the field of patent law. The number of
patents issued has grown from 57,888 in 1982—the year Congress
created the court—to a record high of 224,505 in 2011.  The359
amount of patent litigation has also increased.  Analyzing these360
data, William Landes and Judge Posner concluded that “the crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit appears to have had a positive and
significant impact on the number of patent applications, the number
of patents issued, the success rate of patent applications, [and] the
amount of patent litigation.”  Interestingly, economists Matthew361
Henry and John Turner have found that the Federal Circuit is more
likely to uphold a patent’s validity, as compared to the regional
circuits before it, but not more likely to find a patent infringed.362
Viewed in combination, this empirical evidence suggests that the
creation of the Federal Circuit has increased patent activity gen-
erally without unduly favoring either patent holders or accused
infringers—an outcome that would seem to please patent lawyers
of all stripes.
Again, however, it would be overly simplistic to conclude that
increased patent-related legal activity is solely due to the Federal
Circuit. Economic factors can spur growth in patenting activity and
patent litigation, and thoughtful commentators have questioned
357. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the
Quality of Law, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 43, 60 (2008).
358. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 20-24 (2005) (describing this phenomenon in the
context of bankruptcy litigation); cf. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court
Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1579-80 (2010) (arguing that
the opinions of “elites,” including members of the legal profession, impact Supreme Court
decision making more than the opinions of the “public as a whole”). 
359. See U.S. Patent Activity Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, supra note 48.
360. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 50, at 348-49.
361. Id. at 352. Again, this is not to say that the Federal Circuit has been the sole force
behind patent law’s increasing prominence. See Long, supra note 3, at 1984-88 (discussing the
successful efforts of the PTO and various interest groups to lobby for increased funding for the
agency).
362. See Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114 (2006).
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whether Federal Circuit legal doctrine truly evinces a pro-litigation
slant.  That said, it is at least plausible that some of the increased363
activity in patent law is due to Federal Circuit power preservation
and expansion. Consider the vertical relationship, in which the
Federal Circuit has frequently reversed district courts on fact-
intensive questions such as claim construction. Indeterminacy in
claim construction could encourage increased litigation by making
litigation the only way to determine the claim’s true meaning and
by encouraging parties to assert weak claims and defenses.364
Ultimately, it might be impossible to confidently make causal
connections between Federal Circuit doctrine and the amount of
work for patent lawyers, simply because of the large number of
variables at play. But the correlation between the creation of the
Federal Circuit and increased patent-related legal activity is too
intriguing to ignore.
Institutional Preservation. Because specialized courts are often
viewed as experimental exceptions to the norm of geographic juris-
diction, judges of specialized courts might also be motivated to pre-
serve the existence of their court. If a specialized court’s caseload is
too small, there may be political pressure to abolish the court or to
add additional areas to the court’s jurisdiction. To avoid this dis-
cussion, the specialized court might adopt legal rules to enlarge the
size of its docket.  For example, the court could enlarge its docket365
by expanding possibilities for interlocutory review, which the
Federal Circuit has done by increasing the availability of manda-
mus.  Also, practices or rules that encourage patent litigation gen-366
erally, such as high reversal rates or the relaxation of patent
validity requirements, could enlarge the court’s docket. Finally, by
holding that all patent-related malpractice cases arise under patent
law,  the Federal Circuit redirected those state-law claims to fed-367
eral court and, ultimately, to itself on appeal. That said, the likely
effect of these developments on the court’s caseload has been small.
363. See Golden, supra note 3, at 680-86.
364. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1745 (noting how indeterminacy in claim
construction deters settlement of patent litigation).
365. As an example of a court changing its rules to enlarge its docket, consider the Eastern
District of Texas, which was one of the first district courts to adopt special local rules for
patent cases and thereafter developed the largest patent docket in the country. See Nguyen,
supra note 258, at 476-77.
366. See supra Part IV.A.2.
367. See supra Part II.B.
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The court decided only about ten malpractice cases between the
time it asserted exclusive jurisdiction over them in 2007 and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn. Although the number of man-
damus petitions filed has recently increased, those matters repre-
sent only about 3 percent of the court’s caseload.  368
In the Federal Circuit’s case, perhaps it is better to focus not on
quantitative data but on a more ethereal conception of institutional
preservation. For example, a specialized court might seek to protect
its institutional identity—and its institutional mission—by ensuring
that the court maintains its current jurisdiction. The Federal
Circuit did this when its then-chief judge, Paul Michel, objected to
a congressional proposal to centralize immigration appeals in the
court,  a move that would have dramatically increased the court’s369
caseload  and likely destroyed its identity as the national patent370
court. Indeed, in his many years on the court, Judge Michel reg-
ularly discussed conceptions of the court’s identity, often emphasiz-
ing the court’s importance to business and commerce.  371
Congress has not necessarily resisted Federal Circuit efforts to
preserve identity or to expand power. For instance, Congress quickly
abandoned the idea of centralizing immigration appeals and
dropped legislative proposals on matters addressed by the court,
368. See Statistics: Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, supra note 263 (showing that
1349 total cases were filed in the Federal Circuit in 2011, 42 of which were petitions for
extraordinary writs). 
369. See Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 3-4 (2006) (statement of Paul R. Michel, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
370. See id. at 3-4, 140.
371. Paul R. Michel, Afterword, Past, Present, and Future in the Life of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1211 (2010) (“In my judgment, the
nation’s future prosperity, or at least a good portion of it, rests on economic growth systems,
particularly the patent system, the international trade system, and the systems for
individuals and companies injured by governmental actions to get monetary redress, including
government contracts, takings and tax refund cases, and many more. Some consider our court
the technology court—and so it is. But it is also the business and commerce court, the
innovation court, and the job-creating, prosperity-expanding court.”); Paul R. Michel,
Foreword, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges
Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1999) (“The Federal Circuit, I think, will survive with
at least its current areas of jurisdiction intact. Even without a formal change in jurisdiction,
the court will become increasingly important to the national economy and the fortunes of
nearly all U.S. corporations, including smaller, privately owned and start-up corporations. In
this sense, the Federal Circuit ultimately may be characterized not so much as a science and
technology court, but as a business court, or the ‘corporation’ court.”).
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such as patent damages.  Most recently, Congress expanded the372
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to include cases in which the only
patent-law claims are counterclaims, reinstating the more expan-
sive jurisdictional rule that the Federal Circuit had applied until
the Supreme Court rejected it in 2002.  These examples raise373
interesting questions for public choice theory about the effectiveness
of the specialized court as an interest group, particularly when it
comes to the court’s efforts to preserve its institutional identity.
* * *
This analysis has introduced four factors that might be uniquely
important when determining how specialized appellate courts such
as the Federal Circuit make decisions in close cases. Specialized
courts are often created to carry out particular missions and, as seen
by the Federal Circuit’s frequent appeal to uniformity, institutional
identity will likely play a role. Also, specialized courts by their very
nature are likely to be viewed by the interested public as less
important than their generalist peers. In response, specialized
courts might seize on their unique ability to enhance the prestige of
the court. Relatedly, specialized courts could seek to increase their
popularity and may be able to do so because of their exclusive juris-
diction and proximity to a smaller bar. Finally, because specialized
courts could be viewed as experimental in a system of geographi-
cally defined jurisdictions, the court could seek to preserve the
institution by favoring rules that enlarge the docket of cases within
its institutional mission and by protecting its existing jurisdictional
structure. 
372. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
373. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(a), 125 Stat. 284, 331
(2011) (legislatively overruling Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,
535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002), in which the Supreme Court held that cases in which the only
patent-law claim is a counterclaim do not arise under patent law and are therefore not subject
to Federal Circuit jurisdiction); see also Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-
Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 736, 738 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that the Federal Circuit
had jurisdiction in cases in which “the district court’s jurisdiction over the complaint was not
based on [28 U.S.C.] § 1338(a) but there is a counterclaim over which the district court would
have § 1338(a) jurisdiction if the counterclaim had been a complaint”).
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B. Directions for Future Inquiry: The Perils of Semispecialization
and the Possibility of Limited Specialization
One way in which future work on the Federal Circuit might add
to this analysis is to incorporate other factors that have been
identified as relevant to judicial behavior on generalist courts, such
as the preference for leisure over hard work,  the desire to main-374
tain collegial relationships with colleagues,  the desire to avoid375
reversal,  and the satisfaction derived from the mere act of376
voting.  Another important step would be to explore in more detail377
how the Federal Circuit’s semispecialized nature influences the
primitive model of decision making sketched in the previous Section.
Although this Article has focused on patent law, the Federal
Circuit has jurisdiction over many nonpatent matters, such as
veterans benefits,  government personnel cases,  and government378 379
contract disputes.  As discussed, specialized courts might have a380
unique ability to promote the importance of the areas of law over
which they have jurisdiction.  This principle could have a corollary381
in that a semispecialized court such as the Federal Circuit could be
able to promote certain areas of its jurisdiction and also marginalize
others. For example, if judges receive significant attention for their
decisions in one field, the judges might care deeply about those
cases and devote more time and effort to them.  By contrast, if an-382
374. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L.
REV. 469, 476 (1998). One obvious analogue in the Federal Circuit is the court’s often-
discussed preference for bright-line rules over context-specific standards. See Lee, supra note
44, at 7 (arguing that formalist rules reduce the cognitive burden of engaging complex
technology); David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 691 (2013) (arguing that,
because the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over all federal patent cases, it benefits more
from bright-line rules than the regional circuits, which decide cases in many different areas).
375. See POSNER, supra note 335, at 61-62. This, too, could be an interesting factor, for the
judges of the Federal Circuit, unlike those of other federal appellate courts, are required to
live within fifty miles of their courthouse. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2006) (requiring the judges
of the Federal Circuit to reside within fifty miles of the District of Columbia).
376. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 115-19 (1997).
377. See Posner, supra note 349, at 15-19.
378. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2006).
379. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3), (9).
380. Id. § 1295(a)(10).
381. See supra notes 16-20, 336-43 and accompanying text.
382. Cf. supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text (arguing that popularity influences
decision making).
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other field within the court’s jurisdiction is largely ignored by the
bar, the academy, and the public, the judges might—consciously or
not—devote less time and care to cases in that area.
The proponents of a semispecialized model of Federal Circuit
jurisdiction argued that it would be the best of all worlds: it would
bring about patent law uniformity while also avoiding the negative
effects theorized to be associated with specialization, such as
interest group capture, lack of deference to trial judges and fact-
finders, and poorly reasoned doctrines stemming from a lack of
dialogue with peer-level courts.  The institutional analysis pre-383
sented in this Article, however, raises the possibility that semi-
specialization is the worst model of achieving uniformity in one
particular area. Not only has Federal Circuit patent law embodied
some problems thought to be associated with specialization, such as
lack of deference to trial tribunals, but semispecialization also
provides an opportunity to prioritize certain areas—most likely the
area the court was created to unify—over others.
For example, although the Federal Circuit has not granted ad-
ministrative-law deference to PTO decisions on patentability,  the384
court has granted deference to other adjudicative bodies it reviews,
such as the Court of Federal Claims, the Merit Systems Protection
Board, and even the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board within the
PTO.  Also, the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate is lower in nonpat-385
ent cases than in patent cases  and is particularly low in areas386
such as veterans benefits and government personnel.  A compre-387
hensive inquiry into power dynamics in nonpatent cases, however,
would be far more complex than the study of patent law presented
in this Article. While one might view this description of nonpatent
adjudication as evidence of power minimization, it is also important
to note that statutes sometimes limit the scope and rigor of appel-
late review in nonpatent cases.  Ultimately, it may be impossible388
383. See POSNER, supra note 333, at 257-58.
384. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 52, at 300.
385. See Kumar, supra note 3, at 1550 & n.7 (citing cases).
386. See Field, supra note 14, at 759-63 (reporting a 28.8 percent reversal rate in patent
cases and a 14.3 percent reversal rate in nonpatent cases).
387. See HOWARD T. MARKEY, THE FIRST TWO THOUSAND DAYS: REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1982-1988, at 20 (1989); James D.
Ridgway, Changing Voices in a Familiar Conversation About Rules vs. Standards: Veterans
Law at the Federal Circuit in 2011, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1175, 1224 (2012).
388. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d) (2006) (limiting Federal Circuit review in veterans cases
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to reach confident conclusions about power dynamics in Federal
Circuit nonpatent cases. 
Scholars of institutional design, however, have shown that admin-
istrative agencies charged with multiple objectives tend to give
prominence to one particular objective—often the objective for which
the agency was established in the first place.  Given the power389
enhancement seen in Federal Circuit patent law and the emphasis
placed on patent jurisdiction at the time of the court’s creation, it
seems possible that a similar dynamic could manifest in the Federal
Circuit. It may, therefore, be useful to consider other jurisdictional
possibilities as prophylactic measures, to ensure that nonpatent
cases are given due consideration and to potentially cure any ill
effects of power enhancement in patent law. 
One approach that I have discussed in prior work is a model of
limited specialization.  This model would preserve the court’s ex-390
clusive patent jurisdiction but remove the court’s exclusive juris-
diction over most or all nonpatent areas. Instead, the court would
have nonexclusive jurisdiction over a broad cross section of cases
normally appealed to the regional circuits.  Exposing the Federal391
Circuit to a broader class of nonpatent cases might remove some of
the influences that have led the court to guard and enhance its
power over patent law relative to other institutions. For example,
the steady flow of cases and greater perceived permanence stem-
ming from a generalized jurisdiction could reduce incentives to
preserve the institution and to use patent law to enhance the court’s
prestige. Moreover, to the extent these nonpatent disputes include
business cases, the court might better understand the innovation
to purely legal issues); Jennings v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 59 F.3d 159, 160 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“Our review of the board’s decision is limited by statute. We may hold unlawful and set aside
any agency action, findings, or conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or unlawful; procedurally deficient; or unsupported by substantial evidence.”
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1994))).
389. Barkow, supra note 24, at 34; see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies
as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2220-21 (2005) (arguing that agencies resolve
conflicting goals “by prioritizing their primary mission and letting their secondary obligations
fall by the wayside,” while discussing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s resistance
to environmental legislation). 
390. See Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1494-1505.
391. See id. at 1498.
1862 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1791
process across industries, addressing a common criticism of the
court’s patent jurisprudence.  392
To be sure, this alternative model raises many questions. For in-
stance, how would the court’s nonpatent docket be constructed? The
court could be given geographic jurisdiction, perhaps through a
merger with the D.C. Circuit or the Fourth Circuit.  Alternatively,393
the court could be randomly assigned cases that would normally be
appealed to the regional circuits.  Or, more radically, the court’s394
jurisdiction could be limited to patent cases only, and the court
could be staffed by judges who are temporarily assigned from the
regional circuits. Although some might question whether these
proposals are politically feasible, Congress has frequently amended
or proposed amending Federal Circuit jurisdiction.  That said, a395
fundamental reworking of the court’s nonpatent jurisdiction would
be a more significant change than any proposal considered to date.
Even if a model of limited specialization could be implemented,
exclusive jurisdiction over patent law might preserve the path-
ologies discussed above. If the court retained exclusive jurisdiction,
it would still have a clear mission of providing uniformity,  and the396
court might continue to inhibit institutions such as the PTO from
crafting substantive patent law. On the other hand, a more gen-
eralized jurisdiction might reduce pressure to be perceived as the
patent court and help eliminate incentives to minimize the role of
other potentially expert bodies. Also, a regular docket of issues that
are addressed in different ways by different circuits might permit
the court to appreciate the benefits of interinstitutional dialogue on
issues of patent law. 
392. See id. at 1499; see also Ori Aronson, Response Comment: Innovation, Aggregation, and
Specialization, 100 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 28, 34 (2012), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/ipsa-
loquitur/response-comment-innovation-aggregation-and-specialization (“If judicial speciali-
zation in an economic context is chosen, then it should be designed to reflect an understanding
of the full impact a legal regime has on economic activity.”); Revesz, supra note 205, at 1164
(noting that generalist judges are more skilled “at applying concepts from other areas of law”).
393. See Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1501.
394. See id. at 1500.
395. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Pluralism on Appeal, 100 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 36, 40 (2012),
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/ipsa-loquitur/pluralismonappeal (discussing the recent ex-
pansion of Federal Circuit jurisdiction to include cases involving patent-law counterclaims
and proposals to grant the court jurisdiction over immigration cases and to remove the court’s
jurisdiction over veterans cases).
396. See Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1453-54.
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Finally, even if limited specialization is good for patent law,
would nonpatent litigants be better off in the regional circuits?
Those courts already handle large caseloads, and they might dele-
gate veterans and personnel matters for resolution by staff attor-
neys and screening panels. That said, the distributive consequences
of judicial delegation at the appellate level are not necessarily
clear.  Also, regional circuit jurisdiction over areas like veterans397
benefits and government contracts might give rise to circuit splits.
On one hand, circuit splits could cause confusion for multicircuit
actors like agencies and contractors. On the other hand, it is not
clear that there is an unusually pressing need to avoid circuit splits
in the Federal Circuit’s nonpatent cases. Uniformity enhances the
ability to predict the legal consequences of one’s actions, but many
nonpatent litigants, like veterans and government employees, do
not plan to become disabled or to suffer an adverse employment
action.  Scholars have vigorously debated the merits of legal uni-398
formity versus percolation,  and this debate might never be re-399
solved. As for concerns about judicial capacity, there are reasonable
arguments that the regional circuits have room on their dockets for
nonpatent cases currently heard by the Federal Circuit.  Although400
the regional circuits hear a large number of cases, their caseloads
have shrunk by about 17 percent over the past five years, and the
Federal Circuit’s nonpatent cases would increase the regional
circuits’ caseload by only about 1 percent.401
In sum, while the idea of limited specialization is a promising one,
these questions illustrate that there is much more work that can be
done to design the optimal litigation system for the Federal Circuit’s
patent and nonpatent litigants alike.
397. Cf. Anna O. Law, The Ninth Circuit’s Internal Adjudicative Procedures and Their
Effect on Pro Se and Asylum Appeals, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 647, 671-72, 679 (2011) (arguing
that the Ninth Circuit’s internal procedures for handling its large docket of immigration
appeals “have noticeable negative consequences for pro se aliens and asylum applicants,” but
also noting that aliens might benefit from the court’s “economies of scale” and “developed
expertise”).
398. See Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1479, 1484.
399. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-1606 (2008)
(summarizing the debate and concluding that “the effects of nonuniformity do not seem all
that troubling”).
400. See Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1495-96.
401. Id. at 1504.
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CONCLUSION
Although scholars have developed increasingly sophisticated
models of judicial decision making, these models have mostly
focused on courts with generalized jurisdiction.  Yet specialized402
courts raise a host of unique issues for decision-making theory. For
example, as this Article has shown, limiting jurisdiction by case
subject matter may create judicial incentives to enhance power over
certain areas. Future research can advance the work done here by
identifying additional factors that might influence the decisions of
specialized courts in an effort to construct a more complete model of
decision making. Going forward, this model would help illuminate
institutional solutions to current problems with the patent system
and would also help ensure a fair forum for all litigants who
currently appear before the Federal Circuit. 
402. For a notable exception, see Banks Miller & Brent Curry, Expertise, Experience, and
Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839, 856 (2009) (finding that Federal Circuit judges with prior experience
in patent law register more ideologically consistent votes in patent cases).
